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THE CONTRACTUAL BASIS OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
EXCLUSIVE AND NON-EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF COURT 
AGREEMENTS 
This article argues that, although choice of court agreements 
can be viewed from a procedural or contractual perspective, 
the predominant approach in Singapore and English law in 
respect of the exclusive jurisdiction agreement has been to give 
primacy to the rationale of the enforcement of a contractual 
bargain, tempered by a judicial discretion in its enforcement 
within the procedural jurisdictional context. It is also argued 
that the only difference between exclusive and non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements lies in the content and scope of the 
agreement between the parties, so the same contractual 
approach (as tempered by procedural considerations) should 
be applied in so far as the court is enforcing a contractual 
agreement. The main difficulty lies in determining the 
promissory content within a non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement. The implications of this analysis go beyond 
questions relating to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the 
court. They also reach the contexts of anti-suit injunctions, 
damages for breach of contracts, and defences to foreign 
judgments. 
YEO Tiong Min 
LLB (National University of Singapore), DPhil, BCL (Oxford); 
Advocate & Solicitor, Singapore; 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. 
I. Introduction 
1 Jurisdiction agreements perform a very significant channelling 
function in the adjudication of cross-border civil disputes. Many 
jurisdictions give effect, to varying degrees, to the parties’ selection of 
venue for and mode of dispute resolution. The choice of court agreement 
is the most significant type of jurisdiction agreement as far as civil 
litigation is concerned. Its significance has in fact been underscored 
recently by the efforts of the Hague Conference on Private International  
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Law to gain worldwide support for a Draft Convention on Exclusive 
Choice of Court Agreements.1 
2 In the common law, the distinction has been traditionally drawn 
between exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court agreements, a 
distinction that is also adopted by the Hague Conference. In an exclusive 
choice of court agreement, the parties agree that disputes falling within 
their dispute resolution agreement will be decided by, and only by, their 
chosen court. In the typical non-exclusive choice of court agreement, the 
parties agree that they can sue one another in the court of a particular 
state, but do not say they cannot bring proceedings in the courts of other 
states. The increasing use, and sophistication in the drafting, of non-
exclusive jurisdiction clauses, as well as growing litigation in relation to 
such clauses, call for closer study of the effect of such agreements. There 
is much potential for confusion in the arena where non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements operate: they may give rise to the same effect2 as 
(or even thought to have stronger effect3 than) exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements; they may require a sui generis approach;4 they may be given 
ordinary weight in the determination of the natural forum;5 or they may 
be given effect to as a very strong factor in the natural forum calculus.6 




1  At the time of writing, the latest draft of the work-in-progress is as of April 2004, 
Annex II in M Dogauchi and T C Hartley, “Preliminary Draft Convention on 
Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements: Draft Report”, December 2004, online: 
Hague Conference on Private International Law <http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/ 
jdgm_pd26e.pdf>. 
2  See, eg, JP Morgan Securities Asia Pte Ltd v Malaysian Newsprint Industries Sdn Bhd 
[2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 41 at [43]; Breams Trustees Ltd v Upstream Downstream 
Simulation Services Inc [2004] EWHC Ch 211 at [21]; Bayerische Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Kong Kok Keong [2002] 4 SLR 283; Societe Generale v Tai Kee Sing 
[2003] SGHC 139; Import Export Metro Ltd v Compania Sud Americana de Vapores 
SA [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 405 at [16]. 
3  In so far as some authorities suggest that a more restrictive approach be taken to the 
factors that may be taken into consideration in the non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement cases than in the case of exclusive jurisdiction agreements, a point that 
was discussed and dismissed in Import Export Metro Ltd v Compania Sud Americana 
de Vapores SA, ibid. 
4  See the “modified Spiliada approach” in British Aerospace Plc v Dee Howard Co 
[1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 368, where the burden is on the party seeking to take the action 
outside the contractual forum to show strong reasons for doing so, and without 
regard to factors foreseeable at the time of contracting. 
5  See, eg, Allied Irish Bank v Ashford Hotels Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 309 at 320; Lehman 
Brothers Special Financing Inc v Hartadi Angkosubroto [1999] 2 SLR 427; Yugiantoro v 
Budiono Widodo [2002] 2 SLR 275. 
6  See, eg, Morin v Bonhams & Brooks Ltd [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 36 at [64]; affirmed 
in [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 880; [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 702 without reference to this 
point. 
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jurisdiction agreements on the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court 
under the common law,7 much less academic attention has been paid to 
the effect of non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements.8 
3 The main thesis of this article is a simple one. It is that the same 
contractual basis that underlies the enforcement of the exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement should be applied to non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements. Consequently, the traditional distinction between exclusive 
and non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements in the common law is an 
illusory one, and while it remains practically useful to distinguish 
between the two, the real question in every case is the content and scope 
of the contractual bargain of the parties. Whereas the obligations are 
sharply defined in the typical exclusive jurisdiction agreement, the 
obligations attached to a non-exclusive jurisdiction can be more complex. 
They are often a matter of inference and should therefore be a question of 
the construction of the specific agreement in each case, in accordance 
with the proper law of the agreement (where it is proved). 
4 The analysis will focus on the Singapore position, but frequent 
references will be made to English cases for guidance. The question is 
considered from the perspective of how a Singapore court will consider a 
choice of court agreement to affect the jurisdictional dispute before it. 
There may well be parallel jurisdictional disputes in foreign countries 
(whether in the chosen court or otherwise) in respect of the same subject 
matter, but this falls outside the scope of this study. 
5 Part II of this article outlines the common law concept of 
jurisdiction, and Part III discusses some fundamental concepts relating to 
jurisdiction agreements. Together, they set out the background against 




7  See, eg, A Bissett-Johnson, “The Efficacy of Choice of Jurisdiction Clauses in 
International Contracts in English and Australian Law” (1970) 19 ICLQ 541; 
Michael Pryles, “Comparative Aspects of Prorogation and Arbitration Agreements” 
(1976) 25 ICLQ 543; Otto Kahn-Freund, “Jurisdiction Agreements: Some 
Reflections” (1977) 26 ICLQ 825; Toh Kian Sing, “Stay of Actions Based on 
Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses under English and Singapore Law” [1991] SJLS 103 at 
410; Andrew S Bell, “Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in Transnational 
Contracts” (1996) 10 JCL 53; Edwin Peel, “Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements: Purity 
and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws” [1998] LMCLQ 182. 
8  Only recent works tend to concentrate on this issue: James J Fawcett, “Non-
Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements in Private International Law” [2001] LMCLQ 234; 
Tan Seow Hon, “A New-Found Significance for Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Agreements?” [2000] SJLS 298; Tan Seow Hon, “Treatment of Multi-Courts 
Jurisdiction Agreements” (2001) 12 SAcLJ 120; Joel Lee, “Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Clauses – Changing Approaches?” [2003] SJLS 593. 
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of the contractual enforcement of exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
within a procedural context. Part V carries that argument further to 
examine its consequences in the context of exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements. Part VI explores the consequences of the contractual analysis 
for non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements. 
II. Outline of international civil jurisdiction 
A. Jurisdiction: Nexus and exercise 
6 In general, in civil cases, whether the Singapore court has 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, in the sense of having legal 
authority to bind the defendant to its decision, depends on the service of 
process on the defendant. Historically, under the common law rules, the 
court may assume jurisdiction over the defendant if the defendant has 
been properly served with process while physically present within the 
territory of the forum, or if the defendant has submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the forum. This rule is now statutorily endorsed in 
Singapore. 9  If the defendant is present, the claimant can serve the 
originating process on the defendant as a matter of right. Service within 
the jurisdiction in accordance with a valid agreement to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Singapore court provides a legal basis of jurisdiction.10 
Submission can also occur during the conduct of legal proceedings by an 
act of the defendant demonstrating irrevocably that he has accepted the 
legal authority of the court to determine the merits of the case. In 
submitting to the jurisdiction, the defendant is estopped from arguing 
that the court has no jurisdiction.11 This type of jurisdiction, derived from 
the common law, does not involve the discretion of the court and is 
commonly known as jurisdiction as of right. 
7 The defendant may, however, challenge the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the court. Today, this challenge is based on the doctrine of 
the natural forum.12 Where jurisdiction is obtained as of right, in the 
absence of a jurisdiction agreement, the defendant may try to persuade 




9  Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Rev Ed), ss 16(1)(a)(i) and 
16(1)(b). See also the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 1999 Rev Ed), s 19. 
10  See Part III Section A of the main text below. 
11  The Messiniaki Tolmi [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 266 at 270. 
12  Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd (The Spiliada) [1987] AC 460, adopted 
in Singapore in numerous cases since Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corp v PT Airfast 
Services Indonesia [1992] 2 SLR 776. 
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available forum that is the clearly and distinctly more appropriate forum 
to hear the case as a matter of convenience, and (if so) that there are no 
reasons of justice – that the claimant will not be deprived of substantial 
justice if the trial were to take place abroad – why the case should 
nevertheless be heard in the Singapore court.13 
8 In addition, there is statutory discretionary jurisdiction in cases 
where the defendant cannot be served within the jurisdiction.14 Under the 
Rules of Court,15 the court may grant leave for service of process out of 
the jurisdiction. The grounds for the granting of such leave are generally 
based on connections between the forum and one of the following: the 
defendant, the subject matter of the dispute, or the cause of action. Before 
leave is granted, the court must be satisfied that there is a good arguable 
case that the situation falls within one of the provisions providing for 
service of process out of jurisdiction,16 that there is a serious issue to be 
tried on the merits,17 and that it is a proper case for leave to be granted.18 
The most important consideration to establish the proper case is that the 
Singapore court should be shown to be the most appropriate forum to 
hear the case.19 The application for service out of jurisdiction is made in 
the first instance by the claimant alone. After the service of process has 
been effected on the defendant overseas, the defendant may apply to set 
aside the service of the writ. For the present purposes, the most 
important ground to support such an application is that the Singapore 
court is not the most appropriate forum to determine the merits of the 
case. This involves the same doctrine of natural forum discussed above, 
except that, in the absence of a jurisdiction agreement, it is up to the 




13  The defendant bears at least the initial legal burden. While the English position is 
that the claimant only has the evidential burden of proving the factors in favour of 
continuing the action (see, eg, Charm Maritime Inc v Kyriakou [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
433 at 444; The Rothnie [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 206 at 211), the position in Singapore is 
less clear and authorities suggest that it may be the legal burden that shifts: PT Hutan 
Domas Raya v Yue Xiu Enterprises (Holdings) Ltd [2001] 2 SLR 49 at [16]–[17] (the 
headnote assumes that it is the legal burden that shifts); PT Jaya Putra Kundur Indah 
v Guthrie Overseas Investments Pte Ltd [1996] SGHC 285 at [26] and [29]; Perwira 
Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd v Soon Peng Yam [1995] 1 SLR 783 at 789–790. But cf The 
Owners of the Ming Galaxy v The Owners of the Herceg Novi [1998] SGHC 303 (“The 
Herceg Novi”) implying that the legal burden in a stay application rests on the 
defendant throughout. 
14  Supreme Court of Judicature Act, supra n 9 above, s 16(1)(a)(ii). 
15  Cap 322, R 5, O 11. 
16  Bradley Lomas Electrolok Ltd v Colt Ventilation East Asia Pte Ltd [2000] 1 SLR 673. 
17  Ibid. 
18  O 11 r 2(2) of the Rules of Court. 
19  The Spiliada, supra n 12. 
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to hear the case. The only distinction is a procedural one, and in fact it is 
not uncommon for the defendant to apply to stay the proceedings, 
instead of applying to set aside the service. The applicable principles of 
natural forum are the same, apart from the burden of proof.20 
9 Thus, putting aside procedural complications, the personal 
jurisdiction of the Singapore court in general international civil litigation 
can be understood in terms of two concepts: the existence of the nexus for 
the jurisdiction, and the exercise of this jurisdiction. The former is 
supplied under the common law by the territorial presence or submission 
of the defendant, and expanded by statute to numerous grounds 
connecting the defendant, the subject matter of the action, or the cause of 
action, to the forum. The latter involves largely the consideration of the 
natural forum doctrine. Where there is no question of breach of a 
jurisdiction agreement, the question is which country’s court should 
determine the merits of the dispute in the interests of the parties and the 
ends of justice.21 The question can arise in the form of whether the 
Singapore court is forum conveniens, whether leave should be granted for 
service out of jurisdiction, or of whether the Singapore court is forum non 
conveniens, ie, whether the action should be stayed in favour of a more 
appropriate court elsewhere. 22  This question involves balancing the 
considerations of the interests of the parties involved (especially factors of 
costs and convenience), as well as wider concerns of convenience and 
justice to third parties involved in the litigation, wastage of resources, the 
risk of inconsistent judgments from different courts and justice in the 
broadest sense, as well as considerations of international comity, ie, the 
respect for the jurisdiction of the courts of other countries. In particular, 
while the claimant’s advantages of having the trial in the forum have been 
downplayed in modern jurisprudence, the cumulative effect of the denial 
of the totality of such advantages could amount to a deprivation of 
substantial justice that would be a sufficient reason for the forum to hear 




20  The Spiliada, supra n 12. Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Bhavani Stores Pte Ltd [1998] 
1 SLR 253. The actual connections and facts are more important than the legal 
procedure invoked: Hindocha v Gheewala [2004] 1 CLC 502 (PC Jersey) at [26]. 
21  See supra n 12.  
22  This distinction translates, but only roughly, into the contexts of discretionary 
jurisdiction and jurisdiction as of right. See Hindocha v Gheewala, supra n 20. 
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B. Anti-suit injunctions 
10 Outside of international conventions, the allocation of 
jurisdiction in cross-border disputes is done on an ad hoc basis by the 
court to which an application is made to hear the case. The doctrine of 
natural forum is the most important technique developed in common 
law countries toward this end. Sometimes it may not be enough for the 
court to control its own jurisdiction. There may be cases where the court 
thinks that it is necessary and proper to try to stop proceedings in a 
foreign country, eg, Ruritania. 
11 When the court grants an anti-suit injunction to restrain a 
person from commencing or continuing proceedings in Ruritania, the 
order is directed at the person, and not the Ruritanian court. Even so, the 
anti-suit injunction is recognised to be invasive, and, as a matter of 
international comity, greater caution is generally exercised before it will 
be granted. As a general rule, in the absence of breach of a jurisdiction 
agreement, an anti-suit injunction will only be granted if the forum is the 
natural forum for the substantive dispute on the merits, and the conduct 
of the party in commencing or continuing the proceedings in Ruritania is 
vexatious or oppressive or unconscionable, or amounts to an abuse of the 
process of the court of the forum.23 The remedy is a discretionary one, 
and the courts are generally mindful of considerations of international 
comity in deciding whether to grant the injunction. It is clearly not 
enough to show that Singapore is the natural forum to persuade the court 
to grant an injunction.24 
III. Jurisdiction agreements: Fundamental distinctions 
A. Prorogation and derogation of jurisdiction 
12 A jurisdiction agreement normally performs one or both of two 




23  In English law, Lord Hobhouse had opined that the anti-suit injunction in non-
contractual contexts only operates to protect the forum court’s proceedings from 
abuse of process: Turner v Grovit [2002] 1 WLR 107 (HL). It is not clear to what 
extent this has changed the law in England (especially with respect to “single” forum 
cases where there are no proceedings in the forum). This restriction has not been 
argued under Singapore law. 
24  Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 (PC Brunei); 
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v Djoni Widjaja [1994] 2 SLR 
816; Koh Kay Yew v Inno-Pacific Holdings Ltd [1997] 3 SLR 121.  
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justification for the chosen court hear the case. The second is derogation: 
it supplies reasons for not having the case decided in a court which the 
parties do not want to hear the case. 
13 Theoretically, prorogation can apply at both levels of our 
understanding of common law jurisdiction. On the first level, it can 
provide a juridical basis for the court’s jurisdiction. This operates under 
the law of Singapore in two ways:25 first, a claimant can serve process in 
Singapore on an overseas defendant who has agreed to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Singapore court, in accordance with the agreed mode 
of service;26 second, if no mode of service has been agreed, or if the agreed 
mode of service requires the service of process out of the jurisdiction, 
then leave of the court may be obtained for service out of the 
jurisdiction.27 On the second level, prorogation can supply, in addition to 
the legal basis of jurisdiction, reasons why the court should exercise its 
jurisdiction to hear the case. What these reasons are or should be will be 
discussed below.28 
14 Similarly, in theory, derogation of jurisdiction can also operate 
on the same two levels. However, under Singapore law, parties cannot by 
their mutual agreement remove an existing juridical basis of the court’s 
jurisdiction over the defendant. Derogation of jurisdiction therefore only 
works on the level of the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction. It will be seen 
below29 that the concept of derogation is analysed in the common law in 
terms of enforcing the parties’ bargain. 
15 An exclusive choice of court agreement performs both 
prorogation and derogation functions. Its prorogation function consists 
of giving the selected court a basis of jurisdiction. Its derogation function 
is the spelling out that other courts should not hear the case. Of course, 
by implication, it is also telling the chosen court to exercise its 
jurisdiction. In this respect, the prorogation effect in the selection of the 
court is usually overwhelmed by the derogation aspect of the agreement: 
the court will not generally allow a party to argue that it should breach its 




25  This is subject to the exception that the parties cannot by mutual agreement confer 
jurisdiction on the court in respect of non-justiciable matters, eg, disputes relating 
directly to title in foreign immovable property. 
26  O 10 r 3 of the Rules of Court. 
27  O 11 r 1(r) and O 11 r 1(d)(iv) of the Rules of Court. 
28  See Parts IV to VI of the main text below. 
29  See Part VI of the main text below. 
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hand, the primary effect of a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement is to 
provide a basis for the chosen court to have jurisdiction. The agreement 
will usually go further to provide reasons for the chosen court to exercise 
its jurisdiction. Here it is important to distinguish between arguments 
why the case should be channelled to the chosen court (prorogation), and 
arguments why the case should not be channelled to any other court 
(derogation). 
16 The concepts of prorogation and derogation of jurisdiction 
agreements also play an important role in anti-suit injunctions, because 
as will be seen below, the derogation effect is an extremely powerful one, 
while the prorogation effect may also have some influence.30 
B. Substance and procedure 
17 An important distinction in the analysis of jurisdiction 
agreements is that between substance and procedure in the conflict of 
laws sense. Matters of substance are governed by choice of law rules of the 
forum, while matters of procedure are always governed by the law of the 
forum. The common law draws a distinction between the jurisdiction 
agreement as a contract, which is a matter of substance, and the effect of 
the contract on the jurisdiction of the forum, which is a matter of 
procedure. Thus, questions relating to the validity and interpretation of 
the jurisdiction agreement are subject to choice of law rules governing 
contracts.31 Essentially, this is the law chosen by the parties to govern the 
agreement, either expressly or impliedly, provided such choice is made 
bona fide, and is not illegal or against public policy; and in the absence of 
such a choice, the agreement is governed by the legal system with the 
closest and most real connection with the transaction and the parties.32 
One important consequence of the substantive characterisation is that 
questions of validity and interpretation of jurisdiction agreements can be 
the subject of issue estoppel by foreign judgments.33 
18 Although the jurisdiction agreement can be governed by its own 
law apart from the law governing the main contract, generally the courts 




30  See Part VI Section C(2) of the main text below. 
31  The Frank Pais [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 529 at 530; The Jian He [2000] 1 SLR 8 at [16]. 
32  Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277 (PC Nova Scotia); Peh 
Teck Quee v Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale [2000] 1 SLR 148. 
33  Baiduri Bank Bhd v Dong Sui Hung [2000] 4 SLR 212. 
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the jurisdiction clause from the rest of the contract. Thus, substantive 
questions may be subject to the application of foreign law, though at the 
stage of litigation where such disputes arise, it is not common for parties 
to lead evidence of foreign law, so in practically all cases, the court applies 
the law of the forum, if not as the law governing the jurisdiction 
agreement, then as the applicable law in default of proof of foreign law. 
19 The effect of a jurisdiction agreement on the jurisdiction of the 
forum is a matter of procedure,34 and is purely within the control of the 
law of the forum. Effectively, this means that the forum determines for 
itself how to give effect to the agreement of the parties (as interpreted in 
accordance with its governing law) in the light of its own rules of 
jurisdiction and judicial policies. 
C. Exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
20 A fundamental distinction is traditionally drawn in the cases and 
the  literature35  between  exclusive  and  non-exclusive  jurisdiction 
agreements. It is a matter of the construction of the particular 
jurisdiction agreement,36 with such regard to surrounding circumstances 
at the time of the agreement,37 whether a jurisdiction agreement is 
exclusive or non-exclusive. Since all choice of court agreements purport 
to prorogate jurisdiction, the defining characteristic of an exclusive
jurisdiction agreement must be the derogation effect that it purports to 
have.38 The key question is whether the parties have intended to create an 
obligation to have their disputes heard only in the chosen court and not 
elsewhere.39
34 The Jarguh Sawit [1998] 1 SLR 648 at [29]–[31] resolved any doubt that any question 
relating to the jurisdiction of the forum must ultimately be determined by the law of 
the forum. 
35  See supra n 7. 
36  This is a substantive choice of law question governed by the proper law of the 
jurisdiction agreement: The Jian He, supra n 31, at [10]. 
37  Whether or not subsequent conduct is relevant depends on the characterisation of 
this issue as substantive or procedural in the conflict of laws, a question that has not 
been resolved under the common law. 
38  Kahn-Freund, supra n 7, at 826–827. 
39 Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Lawrence Collins gen ed) (Sweet &  
Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2000) at para 12-078; Sinochem International Oil (London) Ltd v 
Mobil Sales and Supply Corp Ltd [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 758 at [32]. 
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21 Whether the word “exclusive” is used or not is by itself not 
determinative.40 Linguistic factors may be important: it is more likely that 
exclusive resort to the chosen court is intended if the parties use 
mandatory words like “shall” and if there has been a submission of all 
disputes, and not merely submission by the parties, to the chosen 
jurisdiction.41 The circumstances may indicate that the parties intended 
the choice of jurisdiction to be an exclusive one. For example, where the 
chosen court would have had jurisdiction anyway,42 and especially if the 
chosen court by its connections with the transaction would prima facie 
have jurisdiction,43 it could be inferred that the parties intended more 
than just submission to the chosen jurisdiction. 
22 Mutuality of right of recourse to the chosen court, in the sense 
that both parties agree to the choice of a relevant jurisdiction, does not by 
itself indicate an exclusive choice of jurisdiction; it is consistent with mere 
submission. 44  Lack of mutuality is also inconclusive. As Hobhouse J 
stated:45  
An exclusive jurisdiction clause is one which imposes a contractual 
obligation on one or more parties to litigate in the stated jurisdiction. 
[emphasis added] 
Indeed, lack of mutuality may be evidence that one party is intended to 
be bound to the chosen jurisdiction – a unilateral exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement. This type of agreement is not uncommon. Such agreements 
may oblige one party to resort to a stated jurisdiction and to go to no 




40  Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera [1994] 1 WLR 588 at 594; Sohio 
Supply Co v Gatoil (USA) Inc [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 588. 
41  British Aerospace Plc v Dee Howard Co, supra n 4. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Gem Plastics Pty Ltd v Satrex Maritime (Pty) Ltd, (1995) 8 ANZ Insurance Cases 
76,127. 
44  FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Ocean Marine Mutual Protection and Indemnity 
Association (1997) 41 NSWLR 117 at 127. 
45  S & W Berisford Plc v New Hampshire Insurance Co [1990] 2 QB 631 at 636. 
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jurisdiction  without  limitation.46  It  may  make  commercial  sense, 
especially for a bank which wants a lender or guarantor to sue it, if at all, 
in its home jurisdiction, while retaining the right to sue the lender or 
guarantor wherever their assets may be found. One party is bound by the 
derogation effect; the other is not. The clause is exclusive as against one 
party, but non-exclusive as against the other. However, it has been 
suggested recently that the only meaningful distinction between an 
exclusive and a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement is that in the former, 
both parties are bound to the chosen forum, while in the latter case, it is 
only the defendant who is bound.47 This can be misleading. 
23 The simplest type of exclusive jurisdiction agreement binds both 
parties to resort to a single stated jurisdiction for disputes falling within 
the jurisdiction agreement. It obliges the parties not to bring the dispute 
elsewhere. This may make commercial sense when the parties put a high 
premium on certainty of the dispute resolution forum.48 Both parties are 
bound by the derogation effect of the clause. The simplest type of non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreement confers jurisdiction on a court of a 
country in order that the chosen court will be available for either party to 
sue the other in it, but neither are obliged to sue only in that forum. This 
may make commercial sense where parties want to identify a primary 
forum for dispute resolution, but to retain the right to commence actions 
elsewhere,49 or if they simply want to reserve the option to resort to the 
courts of one or more specified jurisdictions. In itself, such a clause is 
merely a prorogation of jurisdiction; there is no purported derogation 
effect as such.  
24 The traditional distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements concentrates on the general right of the parties to 
commence actions in courts of law other than the chosen court and how 
46 Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588 at 594: 
The juxtaposition of a submission by the defendants to the jurisdiction of the 
English courts and the option reserved in favour of the bank to sue elsewhere … 
suggests that a similar option in favour of the defendants was deliberately 
omitted … [and] evinces a clear intention that the defendants, but not the bank, 
would be obliged to submit disputes in connection with the loan facility to the 
English courts.  
See also Ocarina Marine Ltd v Marcard Stein & Co [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 524 and 
Baiduri Bank Bhd v Dong Sui Hung, supra n 33, at [12] and [21]. 
47 JP Morgan Securities Asia Pte Ltd v Malaysian Newsprint Industries Sdn Bhd, supra
n 2, at [43]; Breams Trustees Ltd v Upstream Downstream Services Inc, supra n 2, at 
[21].
48  See, eg, Sohio Supply Co v Gatoil (USA) Inc, supra n 40, at 591–592. 
49 BAS Capital Funding Corp v Medfinco Ltd [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 652 at [186]. 
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the contract either restricts the right (exclusive) or it does not (non-
exclusive). It will be argued below50 that this fails to reflect the modern 
understanding of the concept of jurisdiction in terms of existence and 
exercise of jurisdiction, and it is the shift in the jurisdictional techniques 
from the existence to the exercise of jurisdiction that has made the non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreement so important today. 
D. Choice of court and other types of jurisdiction agreements 
25 The choice of court agreement is the classic jurisdiction 
agreement in the context of cross-border civil dispute resolution. Such 
agreements, which will form the focus of this article, have an important 
bearing on the question of the nexus and exercise of jurisdiction, as well 
as the issue of anti-suit injunctions. There are other types of 
jurisdictional agreements in the broader sense, like arbitration and 
mediation agreements, which perform important derogation functions.  
26 The enforcement of arbitration agreements is well established in 
Singapore, but it raises different policy considerations from the 
enforcement of choice of court agreements. An important distinction lies 
in the chosen mode of dispute resolution. The jurisdiction of arbitration 
tribunals is almost purely a matter of contract between the parties, and 
there is an internationally-recognised regime for arbitration; these 
provide compelling reasons for the courts to enforce strictly a valid 
arbitration agreement. Where the arbitration does not fall within such an 
international regime and is regarded as a domestic matter, the law 
understandably allows the courts greater control over the displacement of 
the judicial process. Arbitration agreements do share one important 
common characteristic with choice of court agreements: the parties’ 
deselection of the venue of dispute resolution by litigation. 
Unsurprisingly, the enforcement of contractual rights has featured very 
strongly in both situations. The consequences are different, reflecting the 
different policy considerations above. The court always retains a 
discretion to hear an action commenced in breach of a choice of court 
agreement, and will indeed exercise its jurisdiction to hear the case if 
strong cause is shown on the facts that it should hear the case. The court 
may stay legal proceedings in the case of an agreement for domestic 
arbitration,51 and must stay legal proceedings in the case of an agreement 
50  See Part VI Section A(2). 
51  Arbitration Act (Cap 10, 2002 Rev Ed), s 7. 
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for international arbitration.52 In addition, the contractual aspect of the 
enforcement is invariably emphasised when the court grants an anti-suit 
injunction to restrain a party from commencing or continuing foreign 
proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement.53
27 The enforceability of mediation clauses has not reached the level 
of sophistication as that of arbitration agreements. It raises many 
questions of domestic law54 as well as private international law55 which are 
beyond the scope of this article. However, if such a clause is a valid and 
enforceable contractual agreement, a court in which legal proceedings are 
started may stay the proceedings in order to give effect to the agreement,56
and in principle it may also be protected by an anti-suit injunction if 
foreign proceedings are started in breach of such a clause.57
IV. The contractual analysis 
28 There are two extreme perspectives from which one could 
consider a choice of court agreement. One is purely procedural. The 
agreement of the parties is no more than an indication by the contracting 
parties of their desire for trial in the chosen court. It is merely an appeal 
to the chosen court to adjudicate their dispute and to other courts to 
refrain from hearing the case. The focus is on the procedure of the courts 
in the allocation of jurisdiction in cross-border disputes, and questions of 
procedural justice will of course be the primary considerations, and only 
the procedural laws of the court to which the jurisdiction question is 
addressed will be relevant. On the other extreme, a choice of court 
agreement is a legally enforceable contract. The focus of analysis will be 
on the enforcement of a contract and on the contractual remedies 
available as a result. Choice of law questions will arise because substantive 
questions of contract law are raised, and the upholding of the parties’ 
52  International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed), s 6. 
53 WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka [2002] 3 SLR 603. 
54  Under Singapore law, they may be too uncertain to be enforced: United Artists 
Singapore Theatres Pte Ltd v Parkway Properties Pte Ltd [2003] 1 SLR 791 at [214]; 
Grossner Jens v Raffles Holdings Ltd [2004] 1 SLR 202 at [43]. See further: Joel Lee, 
“The Enforceability of Mediation Clauses in Singapore” [1999] SJLS 229, Joel Lee, 
“Mediation Clauses at the Crossroads” [2001] SJLS 81; Joel Lee, “ADR Clauses and 
Enforcement” [2003] LMCLQ 164. 
55  The question of which aspects of the agreement are substantive (and therefore 
subject to its governing law) and which aspects are procedural (and therefore subject 
to the law of the forum) has not been fully investigated. 
56  See, eg, Australian Power and Water Pty Ltd v Independent Public Business Corp of 
Papua New Guinea [2003] NSWSC 1227. 
57  Although the point has not been judicially tested to the knowledge of this writer. 
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bargain will be the primary consideration.58 It is possible to find positions 
in between. The common law has indeed found such a position: the 
starting point of analysis is a contractual one, and the theme of 
contractual enforcement is a powerful one, tempered by a judicial 
discretion to determine the exercise of its own jurisdiction. 
29 The contractual basis of the enforcement of jurisdiction 
agreements in the common law manifests itself in the use of the remedies 
of the forum for the breaches of jurisdiction agreements. Under 
Singapore law, the most important of the remedies for the prevention of 
breaches of contract is the injunction. This is an equitable remedy that 
originated historically in the court of Chancery dating back to the days 
when common law and equity were administered in different courts of 
law in England, which division of jurisdiction was reflected in the internal 
judicial divisions in the court established in the Straits Settlements when 
English law was first imported into Singapore. Contractual rights were 
ordinarily enforced in the common law courts by way of actions for the 
recovery of promised payments or damages for breach of contract. 
Occasionally, the innocent party would resort to the equitable 
jurisdiction to have the contract specifically performed, or more 
commonly outside the context of land transactions, to apply for an 
injunction to restrain a breach of contract. Although the injunction was a 
discretionary remedy, like specific performance, and given only when 
common law damages would be inadequate, it was more readily granted 
by the courts,59 partly because it was seen as less of an imposition on a 
person’s liberty that he should not do something than that he should be 
ordered to do something, and partly because it did not usually involve the 
same level of supervision that was required for an order of specific 
performance. The injunction was directed at the respondent (the party 
threatening to breach the contract) personally, and ordered the 





58  In the European Union, the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome Convention) [1998] OJ L266), Article 1(2)(d) exempts from its 
scope questions relating to jurisdiction agreements because some countries in the 
Union consider the issue to be a contractual one, while others did not. 
59  Doherty v Allman (1878) LR 3 App Cas 709 at 719–720. An assumption that has yet 
to be challenged in the courts in common law countries is that the law of the forum 
governs the issue of both the availability of specific (injunctive) relief and its 
appropriateness in each case, including the question of inadequacy of common law 
damages. The availability of specific relief is arguably an issue of substantive contract 
law, being a question relating to the nature of the right being enforced by the forum. 
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30 When the administration of common law and equity were 
merged into a single court system,60 it became infeasible for the equity 
division of the court to order someone not to resort to the common law 
division of the same court.61  Instead, in cases where the applicable 
principles would have justified the issue of the common injunction before 
the merger of the courts, the court would now be asked to stay the 
proceedings.62 This is the principle underlying cases not governed by 
statute,63 where the court would ordinarily stay an action commenced in 
breach of a jurisdiction agreement. In Racecourse Betting Control Board v 
Secretary for Air, MacKinnon LJ explained that in such cases:64  
[T]hat power and duty [to stay proceedings] arose under a wider 
general principle, namely, that the court makes people abide by their 
contracts, and, therefore, will restrain a plaintiff from bringing an 
action which he is doing in breach of his agreement with the defendant 
that any dispute between them shall be otherwise determined. 
31 What could no longer be done by an injunction because of 
changes to the court structure would now have to be achieved by the 
technique of stay. This remedy is tempered by the discretion of the court, 
a discretion which has developed a fair degree of sophistication to balance 
the agreement of the parties on the one hand, and the procedural aspects 
of jurisdiction allocation in international civil litigation on the other.  
32 There is therefore a clear link between the stay of proceedings in 
cases of breach of jurisdiction agreement, and another important remedy 
available in the same context, the anti-suit injunction. While the court is 
prohibited from restraining parties from seeking justice from itself, it is 
not so constrained (except by considerations of comity) to restrain 
parties from resorting to courts of other jurisdictions. The common 
injunction of the equity court, intended to protect contractual rights, is 
thus the historical source of the two most important remedies for 
breaches of jurisdiction agreements today. This link is recognised in 
modern English authorities, which have observed that in cases of breach 
of jurisdiction agreements, the same test applies to applications for stay of 
proceedings and the anti-suit injunction, since they both serve the 




60  In England: Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (c 66). The equivalent also 
occurred in Singapore in the Courts Ordinance 1878, s 10. 
61  Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed), s 3(e). 
62  Ibid s 3(f). 
63  Eg, the International Arbitration Act, supra n 52. 
64  [1944] Ch 114 at 126. See also The Fehmarn [1958] 1 WLR 159 at 163–164.  
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considerations of comity carry different weight because of the difference 
in the nature and effect of the two remedies.65 
33 A third remedy for the breach of contract, monetary damages, is 
just beginning to manifest itself as a potential remedy for breaches of 
jurisdiction agreements. Recently, the English Court of Appeal decision 
has allowed a claim for wasted costs incurred in staying proceedings 
commenced in a foreign jurisdiction in breach of a jurisdiction 
agreement,66 and the House of Lords has subsequently observed that it 
may additionally be possible to obtain substantial damages for such 
breaches.67 If the common law courts continue to look at jurisdiction 
agreements through the analytical lens of contract law, it is difficult to see 
why damages should not be an available remedy for breaches of contract, 
provided it is available under the governing law of the contract. Indeed, it 
might give the court more flexibility if it should decide not to use the 
specific remedies of stay or anti-suit injunctions. But there is another 
view, stemming from the procedural perspective, which has not yet 
permeated to the judiciary, that the choice of court agreement is not like 
any other term of the contract.68 It is merely a non-contractual expression 
of the parties’ intention to the court of their choice of venue for trial; it 
has no independent substantive existence.69 On the latter view, the court, 
when considering the effect of a jurisdiction agreement on its jurisdiction, 





65  Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425 at [24]; Ultisol Transport Contractors 
Ltd v Bouygues Offshore SA [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 140 at 149; Akai Pty Ltd v People’s 
Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90 at 105 (QBD). 
66  Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller [2002] 1 WLR 1517. See also Maersk Sealand v Ali 
Hussein Akar [2003] EWHC Comm 797. 
67  Donohue v Armco Inc, supra n 65, at [48]. See also Daniel Tan, “Damages for Breach 
of Jurisdiction Clauses” (2002) 13 SAcLJ 342; Daniel Tan & Nik Yeo, “Breaking 
Promises to Litigate in a Particular Forum: Are Damages an Appropriate Remedy?” 
[2003] LMCLQ 435; cf Tham Chee Ho, “Damages for breach of English jurisdiction 
clauses: more than meets the eye” [2004] LMCLQ 46; Ho Look Chan, “Anti-suit 
injunctions in cross-border insolvency: A Restatement” (2003) 52 ICLQ 697, 707–
709.  
68  See Tham, supra n 67. 
69  See Ho Look Chan, supra n 67. 
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V. The effect of exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
A. Exercise of jurisdiction 
34 The contractual basis of the enforcement of an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement is clearly established under Singapore law. At the 
same time, there is also evidently much continuing tension with 
procedural considerations of where the trial ought to be held in spite of 
the agreement of the parties. 
35 In an application to stay proceedings commenced in Singapore in 
breach  of  an  exclusive  foreign  jurisdiction  clause,70  the  courts  will 
ordinarily71 stay the proceedings to give effect to the agreement of the 
parties, unless the party commencing the action in breach of contract can 
show exceptional circumstances amounting to strong cause why the 
agreement should not be adhered to.72 The law in Singapore was first 
comprehensively set out by the Court of Appeal in Amerco Timbers Pte 
Ltd v Chatsworth Timber Corp Pte Ltd:73
... Where a plaintiff sues in Singapore in breach of an agreement to 
submit their disputes to a foreign court, and the defendant applies to a 
stay, the Singapore Court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within its 
jurisdiction, is not bound to grant a stay but has a discretion whether to 
do so or not. The court in exercising its discretion should grant the stay 
and give effect to the agreement between the parties unless strong cause 
is shown by the plaintiff for not doing so, To put it in other words the 
plaintiff must show exceptional circumstances amounting to strong 
cause for him to succeed in resisting an application for a stay by the 
defendant. In exercising its discretion the court should take into 
account all the circumstances of the particular case. In particular, the 
court may have regard to the following matters, where they arise: - 
(a)  In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated or 
more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative 
70  In respect of arbitration agreements not falling within the International Arbitration 
Act, supra n 52, where the court has a discretion to stay proceedings, the party 
commencing proceedings in breach of agreement has to show “sufficient reason” 
why the court should not stay the action to give effect to the agreement: SA Shee & 
Co (Pte) Ltd v Kaki Bukit Industrial Park Pte Ltd [2000] 2 SLR 12 at [39]. 
71  Forum mandatory statutes may require the courts not to give effect to the 
jurisdiction agreement: The Epar [1984–1985] SLR 409. 
72  The same principles generally apply where the claimant is seeking leave from the 
court for service of process out of the jurisdiction. 
73  [1975–1977] SLR 258 (“Amerco Timbers”) at 260, [11]. The test is adopted from the 
English case of The El Amria [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 119. 
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convenience and expense of trial as between the Singapore and 
foreign courts. 
(b)  Whether the law of the foreign court applies and, if so, whether 
it differs from Singapore law in any material respects. 
(c)  With what country either party is connected and, if so, how 
closely. 
(d)  Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign 
country, or are only seeking procedural advantages. 
(e)  Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue in 
the foreign court because they would: 
(i)  be deprived of security for their claim; 
(ii)  be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; 
(iii)  be faced with a time-bar not applicable here; or 
(iv)  for political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely 
to get a fair trial. 
36 Although the factors considered are remarkably similar to those 
considered for determining the natural forum for the trial, it has been 
emphasised that the two tests are different. The standard applied is higher 
in breach of jurisdiction agreement cases than in forum non conveniens 
cases, because the objective of the test is not to determine the natural 
forum for the dispute but to determine whether there are sufficient 
grounds for allowing one of the parties to renege on the contract. The 
question is whether it would cause “unreasonableness and injustice” to 
enforce the agreement.74 Thus, it is generally harder to convince the court 
that it should stay proceedings commenced in breach of a jurisdiction 
clause than it is to convince the court to stay proceedings because there is 
a more appropriate forum elsewhere.  
37 The protection of the contractual agreement in the Singapore 
courts reached a high-water mark in the early 1990s, when it appeared 
that the burden of justifying the breach of contract was a very onerous 
one. Thus, in The Asian Plutus, 75  the High Court stayed an action 
commenced in Singapore in breach of an exclusive foreign jurisdiction 




74  The Vishva Apurva [1992] 2 SLR 175 at 182. 
75  [1990] SLR 543 at 546–548, noted in Toh Kian Sing, “Staying an Action Commenced 
in Breach of a Jurisdiction Clause: A Note on The Asian Plutus” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 314. 
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be upheld and given full effect unless their enforcement would be 
unreasonable and unjust”.76 In The Humulesti,77 the High Court suggested 
that in order to show strong cause, one had to look at very serious factors 
like paralysis of the court system, breakdown of law and order, 
unavailability of legal representation, unavailability of translation or 
interpretation services, or fundamental change in the legal system, in the 
chosen country. In The Vishva Apurva,78 the Court of Appeal suggested 
that the strong cause needed was something equivalent to such grave 
difficulty and inconvenience of trial in the chosen foreign court that 
staying the proceedings in the non-contractual forum would amount to 
denying the claimant “his day in court”; apart from that, the parties 
should be held to their bargain.  
38 This strict approach was reconsidered by the High Court in the 
mid-1990s in The Eastern Trust.79 The court held that the degree of strong 
cause required in each case depended on the circumstances of the case. 
Important factors to take into account in determining the strength of 
exceptional circumstances included the nature of the agreement itself 
(the degree to which the jurisdiction clause represented the genuine 
agreement80 of the parties), the degree of surprise on the party held 
bound to the jurisdiction clause, and the strength of the connections of 
the case to the chosen country compared to the connections with the 
forum. This sliding scale approach to “strong cause” has since been taken 
to represent the law in Singapore.81  
39 While the strength of the exceptional circumstances may vary 
from case to case, it is nevertheless clear that breach of jurisdiction 
agreement cases will be treated differently from the natural forum cases 




76  Id at 547. 
77  [1991] SGHC 161. 
78  Supra n 74, at 189, noted in Adrian Briggs “Jurisdiction Clauses and Judicial 
Attitudes” (1993) 109 LQR 382. 
79  [1994] 2 SLR 526, noted in Kenneth Tan, “The Eastern Trust: How Exclusive is an 
Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause?” (1994) 6 Asia Business Law Rev 48. 
80  This is particularly important in the carriage of goods context where parties may not 
know the terms of the contract to which they become parties by operation of 
statutory law. 
81  See, eg, Bambang Sutrisno v Bali International Finance Ltd [1999] 3 SLR 140 at [8]; 
Baiduri Bank Bhd v Dong Sui Hung, supra n 33, at [16]; The Hyundai Fortune [2004] 
2 SLR 213 at [8], affirmed by the Court of Appeal in [2004] 4 SLR 548. In contrast, 
the English courts appear to apply the same standard so long as it can be said that the 
obligation contained in the jurisdiction agreement has been freely adopted: Import 
Export Metro Ltd v Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA, supra n 2, at [14(iii)]. 
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on the party seeking to justify a breach of agreement while in the latter 
case, it depends on how jurisdiction is invoked; and second, to the large 
extent that the factors considered are the same, a factor that may attract 
heavy weight in a straight natural forum approach may be given little or 
no weight when balanced against a breach of contract. 
40 Logically, if the reason for staying an action commenced in the 
forum is to give effect to the parties’ bargain, then it should follow that 
any delay in the stay application does not detract from the fact that the 
applicant is seeking to enforce the jurisdiction agreement. It should 
follow from the principle of bargain enforcement that any factor of 
convenience or juridical advantage pointing towards one forum or 
another that is foreseeable by the parties should be disregarded in 
determining whether exceptional circumstances amounting to strong 
cause have been shown to justify the breach of agreement.82 It should also 
follow that the party who commences an action in Singapore in breach of 
contract should not be allowed to complain that the party who wants the 
jurisdiction agreement enforced is seeking procedural advantages in the 
chosen forum. Contracting parties must be taken to have known and 
accepted these considerations. However, the cases reveal that sometimes 
the courts steer closer to the natural forum test. 
41 One area where the Singapore courts have held firmly to the 
contract-enforcement view is in respect of the delay in the stay 
application. In such cases, the delay is only a factor to be considered if it 
amounts to a waiver of the right to rely on the jurisdiction agreement.83  
42 On the other hand, the Singapore Court of Appeal has held that 
in assessing whether strong cause has been made out to justify the 
bringing of proceedings in Singapore in breach of contract, all factors, 
whether foreseeable or not, will be taken into consideration, although 
foreseeable factors will be given little weight.84 Although little weight may 
be given to the individual factors, the court will take a cumulative 




82  An exception may be factors affecting third parties (eg, inconvenience to witnesses) 
and factors implicating wider policy considerations like inconsistency of judgments 
from multiple jurisdictions: Peel, supra n 7, at 223–224. 
83  The Vishva Apurva, supra n 74, at 185; The Jian He, supra n 31, at [47]–[50]. Delay 
may be evidence of some other relevant consideration, eg, whether the party seeking 
to enforce the contract is genuinely seeking trial abroad: The Kapitan Mezentsev 
[1995] 3 SLR 55, noted in Tan Yock Lin, “Natural or Agreed Forum? – The Kapitan 
Mezentsev” [1995] SJLS 661; The Hyundai Fortune, supra n 81, at [27].  
84  The Hyundai Fortune, supra n 81, at [30]. 
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the weight given to each) that will be finally decisive.85 In contrast, under 
English law, the parties are generally precluded from raising such 
foreseeable factors.86 It is only in rare situations that the court will attach 
any weight to such factors.87 It is not clear what these rare circumstances 
may be,88 and it may be that the approach differs from the Singapore 
approach only by a matter of degree.  
43 Be that as it may, the Singapore approach may be justified on two 
possible bases. First it may be argued that since the court takes into 
consideration the nature of the agreement in respect of the jurisdiction 
clause, so that some kinds of agreement require very strong 
countervailing factors and others less so, then it would be unfair to apply 
a bright-line test of foreseeability in deciding which factors to take into 
account in ascertaining the existence of strong cause. The second 
argument may be that as a matter of policy, the test of “unreasonableness 
and injustice” required to offset the enforcement of a jurisdiction 
agreement has been read very broadly to give greater weight to 
considerations of natural forum. On either view, the courts are moving 
the test a step farther away from the contractual analysis and closer to the 
natural forum analysis. 
44 An ambiguous factor that is built into the test of strong cause is 
the sub-test of whether the party seeking to stay the proceedings in the 
forum is genuinely seeking trial abroad, or is merely seeking procedural 
advantages.89 Whether the party is genuinely seeking trial abroad is surely 
a valid consideration, for the court must protect its processes from being 
abused by parties who are strategising not to have the trial held anywhere 
at all. The reference to “procedural advantages” is generally taken to mean 
advantages in the contractually chosen90 jurisdiction.91 It is difficult to see 
what is wrong with a party seeking the procedural advantages of a forum 
that has been chosen exclusively in the contract. That may be part of the 




85  The Eastern Trust, supra n 79, at 534; The Hyundai Fortune, supra n 81, at [24]. 
86  The Nile Rhapsody [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 399 at 414, affirmed by the English Court of 
Appeal in [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 382 at 391; British Aerospace Plc v Dee Howard Co, 
supra n 4, at 376. 
87  Breams Trustees Ltd v Upstream Downstream Services Inc, supra n 2. 
88  It may be confined to factors mentioned in supra n 82, or it may be wider. 
89  A factor which greatly troubled at least one author: A Bell, Forum Shopping and 
Venue in Transnational Litigation (Oxford University Press, 2003) at para 5.89. 
90  The Jian He, supra n 31; The Hyundai Fortune, supra n 81. 
91  An abuse of process in the sense mentioned in the main text is clearly the taking of 
an unfair advantage of the procedure of the forum that should not be allowed. 
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party applying to stay the action is trying to abuse the jurisdictional rules 
of the forum. But it is difficult to infer an abusive objective merely from 
the fact that one party is seeking the procedural advantages of the chosen 
forum. These procedural advantages must surely include the rules of 
jurisdiction of the chosen forum, as well as the choice of law rules that are 
applied by that forum. These are major considerations when parties select 
an exclusive jurisdiction for dispute resolution. 
45 Thus, parties may choose a jurisdiction because its rules of 
procedure or choice of law rules may give an outcome that the parties 
desired at the time of contracting, and that desired outcome may well be 
that under the choice of law rules of the chosen forum, issues of 
limitations are characterised as substantive and can give rise to 
substantive contractual rights. This is an increasingly likely scenario, as 
more jurisdictions move towards a substantive characterisation of time 
limitation laws.92 On the other hand, Singapore conflict of law rules, 
unless revised judicially or legislatively, are likely to lead to the outcome 
that the limitations laws are procedural93 and therefore no substantive 
rights are involved. This could have a distorting effect if the courts view 
the matter purely through their own choice of law rules.  
46 The Singapore court has made abundantly clear its position on 
the relevance of the lapse of the time-bar in the contractually chosen 
jurisdiction in the strong cause test. If the party seeking trial in the forum 
in breach of agreement shows that the lapse (eg, in failing to take out a 
protective writ in the chosen forum) was a reasonable one in the 
circumstances, then he can rely on the time-bar to show exceptional 
circumstances why the trial should be held in the forum. However, if the 
party has acted unreasonably in allowing the time limitation to lapse in 
the chosen forum, then the time-bar is merely a neutral factor. Neither 
party can rely on it one way or the other, but the party seeking trial in the 
forum could still point to other factors against a stay of proceedings.94 




92  In English law: Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 (c 16): There has been a trend in 
the common law towards a functional characterisation of substance and procedure: 
Harding v Wealands [2005] 1 WLR 1539; Tolofson v Jensen [1994] 3 SCR 1022 at 
1071–1072; John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503 at [99]. 
93  See Huber v Steiner (1835) 2 Bing NC; 132 ER 80; Ralli v Anguilla (1915) 15 SSLR 33; 
Limitation Ordinance (Ord VI of 1896), s 11, which was operative from 1896–1959; 
Star City Pty Ltd v Tan Hong Woon [2002] 2 SLR 22 at [12]: “A distinction is drawn 
between the essential validity of a right and its enforceability.” 
94  Golden Shore Transportation Pte Ltd v UCO Bank [2004] 1 SLR 6 at [52]; The 
Hyundai Fortune, supra n 81, at [30]. 
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procedural even in foreign systems has yet to be contradicted by counsel 
with any clear evidence of foreign law. However, if the chosen forum takes 
a substantive characterisation of time-limitation laws, then a failure to 
stay the proceedings would not merely countenance a breach of a 
jurisdictional agreement (here said to be justified by the strong cause 
argument on procedural grounds), but would also effectively deprive the 
party of a substantive pre-emptive right against being sued (on the same 
procedural justifications). This outcome is not necessarily reasonable 
without further justification for the deprivation of substantive rights 
which would have been conferred by the chosen forum. Even if limitation 
periods are regarded as procedural under the private international law of 
the chosen forum, it is still a viable argument that the parties have 
contractually bound themselves to accept the procedural law as defined 
by the chosen court – what else can they be doing in choosing that forum 
for litigation?95 – and this is no less a substantive contractual right.  
47 The treatment of lapse of time limitation arguably cannot be 
transposed without modification from the context of the natural forum 
to that of contract enforcement. From the perspective of contract, it is 
arguable that if the claimant had acted reasonably in letting the time lapse 
in the foreign jurisdiction, then by itself 96this should only be a neutral 
factor between the parties; this is part of the package of the bargained-for 
forum that the claimant has to show strong cause to depart from. If the 
claimant had acted unreasonably,97 it is a neutral factor to the extent that 
the defendant’s advantage of trial in the chosen forum is already part of 
the established agreement the departure from which the strong cause test 
is applied to justify. But ultimately, all circumstances should be 
considered, and arguably, the unreasonable behaviour of the claimant in 
causing the advantage of the defendant to accrue in the chosen 
jurisdiction could push the “strong cause” up the sliding scale. 
95 The Asian Plutus, supra n 75, at 551. 
96  Particular circumstances may justify inferences of bad faith conduct on the part of 
the defendant that rendered the claimant’s lapse a reasonable one; this goes to the 
different argument of whether the defendant is forum-shopping and possibly 
abusing the process of the court. See para 50 of the main text below. 
97  Likewise in particular circumstances, the claimant’s unreasonable behaviour could 
also be evidence of forum-shopping and possibly abusing the process of the court. 
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48 The conflict between contract enforcement and procedural 
considerations is found starkly in the related “no dispute” argument.98
Here, the pattern of argument of the party seeking the court’s permission 
to breach the jurisdiction agreement is that there is no real dispute in 
issue, and that the party seeking the enforcement of the jurisdiction 
agreement is not genuinely seeking trial abroad, and merely seeking 
procedural advantages. The argument is not a contractual one that there 
is no dispute falling within the terms of the jurisdiction clause. Instead, 
this argument is premised on the existence of a dispute to be resolved in 
accordance with the jurisdictional agreement in the contractual sense, but 
that the jurisdictional agreement is nevertheless not to be enforced 
because of strong cause, specifically, in this case, the lack of genuine 
desire for trial abroad. 
49 It is curious to characterise these as cases where there is 
“effectively no defence to the claim”.99 This may well be so if the party 
seeking to enforce the jurisdiction agreement does not lead any evidence 
to show that a different result would have been obtained in the 
contractual forum.100 In many of these cases,101 it seems to have been 
accepted at least, that there is a real dispute whether the claimant should 
win in the forum where the action was commenced in breach of 
agreement (because of the forum’s limitations rules as indicated by its 
own conflict of laws rules), or should lose in the contractually chosen 
forum (because the claims would be time-barred under the limitation 
laws applicable under its conflict of laws rules). But the court does not see 
that as a dispute between the parties. What the court sees as the dispute is 
the substantive question of liability – but that presupposes that limitation 
laws do not affect substantive rights, which is a clearly forum-centric 
view. However, the approach of the court cannot be faulted if no evidence 
is tendered to show that the contractually chosen forum would take a 
different conflict of laws approach.102 If the evidence indicates otherwise, 
98  See Christopher Tan, “Recent Developments in the Field of Jurisdiction Clauses: 
When is there a Dispute to be Tried in the Contractual Forum?” (2000) 11 SAcLJ 396 
and Daniel Tan, “No Dispute Amounting to Strong Cause; Strong Cause for 
Dispute?” (2001) 12 SAcLJ 428. 
99 The Hyundai Fortune, supra n 81, at [18]. 
100  As in, eg, The Hung Vuong-2 [2001] 3 SLR 146. 
101 The Jian He, supra n 31; Golden Shore Transportation Pte Ltd v UCO Bank, supra
n 94, noted in Vincent Leow, “Exclusively Here to Stay: The Applicable Principles to 
Granting a Stay on the Basis of an Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause” [2004] SJLS 569; 
The Hyundai Fortune, supra n 81. 
102 Cf UCO Bank v Golden Shore Transportation Pte Ltd [2003] SGHC 137, affirmed, 
supra n 94, where the High Court went so far as to suggest that it is only the forum’s 
own view on the limitation defence that is relevant (at [70]). 
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then it would seem appropriate that the court should assess the matter 
from a broader global perspective taking into consideration the conflict 
of laws position of the chosen forum.  
50 This suggested approach admittedly contains shades of renvoi.
But there is nothing objectionable in principle about this recourse.103 If 
there is a dispute about whether there is a dispute between the parties, 
and the parties have submitted all disputes to be determined exclusively 
by a jurisdiction, a defensible view is that the question whether there is a 
dispute to be resolved at all should be determined by the chosen 
jurisdiction, unless the party seeking to stay the action is seen to be 
abusing the process of the court. This appears to be the position for 
international arbitration,104 and it is arguable that that position ought not 
to be too different for choice of court agreements; in both cases, the 
courts seek to respect and encourage party autonomy in the selection of 
dispute resolution venues. If the court thinks it can and should take the 
decision on the existence of the dispute in order to avoid unnecessary 
delay should it refuse to hear the case, then the next best thing to 
remitting the case abroad to the chosen jurisdiction is to decide the case 
as closely as it can in the way that the chosen jurisdiction would have 
done.105
51 There is no doubt that the genuineness of the desire for trial 
abroad is a very relevant factor, and it is necessarily a factor that operates 
outside the contractual framework in the sense that the forum being 
asked to stay the action must ultimately and necessarily decide whether 
the strategy of the party seeking the stay is a legitimate one or not. 
However, there have been a few distractions that have not appeared to 
take full consideration of the contractual basis of the application for stay. 
One is the seeking of procedural advantages in the chosen forum. 
Without exceptional facts, if the action is time-barred in the chosen 
forum and not time-barred in the non-contractual forum, one should 
not too readily assume that the party seeking trial in the non-contractual 
forum is the one illegitimately seeking procedural advantages in that 
103  See, eg, the draft Hague Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, 
Art 7(a) (supra n 1), which remits the question of whether the jurisdiction agreement 
is null and void to the law of the chosen court, including its choice of law rules. Thus, 
all courts before which the question of the enforcement of the jurisdiction agreement 
arises will apply the private international law rules of the chosen court. 
104  See Baltimar Aps Ltd v Nalder & Biddle Ltd [1994] 3 NZLR 129 considering words in 
the New Zealand Arbitration (Foreign Agreements and Awards) Act 1982, s 4(1), 
that are in pari materia with the International Arbitration Act, supra n 52, s 6(2). 
105  Adrian Briggs, “In Praise and Defence of Renvoi” (1998) 47 ICLQ 877. 
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forum. A related point is the “no dispute” debate which appears (thus far) 
to be conducted from the viewpoint of the non-contractual forum alone. 
This does not suggest that the cases were wrongly decided, for the court 
must review the totality of the evidence to determine whether the court 
thinks injustice would result from staying the proceedings and whether 
the party seeking to stay the action is actually engaging in undesirable 
inverse forum shopping in the sense of closing off the only forum 
effectively available to the party seeking to breach the contract. 
52 The same principles should apply whether the jurisdiction 
agreement points to the court of the forum or a foreign country,106 even 
though it has been suggested in an English case that in the former 
situation, the court has no discretion at all to stay such proceedings 
commenced in the forum on grounds of forum non conveniens.107 It is 
probably more accurate to say that it will be very difficult to convince the 
court of the forum that substantial justice cannot be done in the forum 
even in a natural forum case,108 let alone a case requiring strong cause. 
53 The approach in Singapore law to the enforcement of exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements attempts to strike a balance between the 
enforcement of the contract and considerations of procedural justice. The 
study of the Singapore position has shown a judicial policy that is paying 
increasing attention to pragmatic considerations of justice. But it is 
clearly not in doubt that the starting point in exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement cases is that the enforcement of the jurisdiction agreement 
requires a different test from the normal principles of natural forum; the 
party who wants the court to assist in a breach of contract must show 
strong cause for the breach of agreement. Whatever the strength or 
content of the strong cause, the reason for the requirement is the need to 
justify the breach of contract. There are no doubt important policy 
considerations that impact on the degree of the strong cause required, 
and these include considerations discussed in The Eastern Trust109 as well 
106 The Chaparral [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 158 at 164. 
107 S & W Berisford Plc v New Hampshire Insurance Co, supra n 45 (Hobhouse J in 
obiter). Cf Bouygues Offshore SA v Caspian Shipping Co (No 2) [1997] ILPr 472. 
108 Cf The Herceg Novi , supra n 13, in the context of forum non conveniens (per Selvam J 
at [11]): 
I am not aware of a decision anywhere whereby a court has stayed an action 
legitimately brought before it on the ground that there is something wanting in 
its system of justice and that better justice will be done in another jurisdiction. 
For my part it would be wrong in principle to do so because I cannot accept 
that the law of Singapore is unjust to either party. 
109 Supra n 79. 
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as those that underlie the doctrine of natural forum110 generally. Unless 
these policy considerations that balance against the principle of 
contractual enforcement are clearly articulated, there is a risk that the 
courts may be perceived as merely paying “lip service” to the enforcement 
of the contract.111
B. Anti-suit injunctions 
54 In the absence of a jurisdiction agreement, an anti-suit 
injunction will only be granted if the forum is the natural forum for the 
substantive dispute and the conduct of the party in commencing or 
continuing foreign proceedings is vexatious or oppressive, and 
considerations of international comity play a significant role.112 However, 
international comity plays a diminished role when the anti-suit 
injunction is sought to restrain a party from committing a breach of 
contract, whether a choice of court or an arbitration agreement.113 In such 
cases, the presumption is in favour of enforcing the contract.114 The 
remedy is still a discretionary one, but good reasons have to be shown 
why the breach of contract (or threat thereof) should not be restrained by 
an injunction. Millett LJ said in the English Court of Appeal in The
Angelic Grace:115
[I]n my judgment there is no good reason for diffidence in granting an 
injunction to restrain foreign proceedings on the clear and simple 
ground that the defendant has promised not to bring them. 
…
The justification for the grant of the injunction in either case is that 
without it the plaintiff will be deprived of its contractual rights in a 
situation in which damages are manifestly an inadequate remedy. The 
jurisdiction is, of course, discretionary and is not exercised as a matter 
110  J J Fawcett, “Trial in England and Abroad: The Underlying Policy Considerations” 
(1989) 9 OJLS 205. 
111  See the cautions in The Asian Plutus, supra n 75, at 550 and The Humulesti, supra
n 77. 
112  See supra n 24.
113  The anti-suit injunction has yet to be applied to the breach of a mediation clause, 
although it is theoretically available since the underlying basis is the same: a 
contractual derogation agreement. 
114 Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] AC 334 at 342; 
CSR Limited v Cigna Insurance Australia Limited (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 392. As to 
the possible relevance of choice of law analysis in this context, see T M Yeo, Choice of 
Law for Equitable Doctrines (Oxford University Press, 2004) at paras 4.31–4.38. 
115  [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 at 96. 
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of course, but good reason needs to be shown why it should not be 
exercised in any given case. 
55 This approach has been qualified in the context of the Brussels I 
Regulation in England where it applies,116 but remains the common law 
approach.117 This common law approach has been adopted in Singapore 
in respect of the enforcement of an arbitration agreement,118 but there is 
no reason to doubt that the same approach will be taken in respect of 
choice of court agreements.119
56 English law has recognised that an exclusive choice of court 
agreement gives rise to the same issue as to the enforcement of the 
agreement, whether the question before the court is one of stay of 
proceedings in the forum, or the grant of an anti-suit injunction to 
restrain foreign proceedings, subject to different considerations of 
international comity.120 Although there have been statements in English 
cases as to how the English court uses the anti-suit injunction to perform 
a favour for foreign countries by keeping wasteful litigation out of their 
courts,121 the more common attitude today is that the anti-suit injunction 
calls for much greater caution because of its indirect interference with the 
proceedings in other countries.122 This is likely to represent Singapore law. 
116  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2001] 
OJ L12/1. The use of the anti-suit injunction has been held to be incompatible with 
the jurisdiction scheme of the Regulation: Turner v Grovit Case C-159/02 [2004] 
2 Lloyd’s 169 (ECJ). The English court cannot use breach of contract as a reason to 
override the jurisdictional allocation under the Regulation: Erich Gasser GmbH v 
MISAT Srl Case C-116/02 [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222 (ECJ). 
117 Through Transport Mutual Insurance Association (Eurasia) Ltd v New India Assurance 
Association Co Ltd (The Hari Bhum) [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 67; West Tankers Inc v RAS 
Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA (The Front Comor) [2005] EWHC 454. 
118 WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka, supra n 53. 
119 Ibid at [85], where the court approved of the statement of Millett LJ in The Angelic 
Grace, supra n 115, at 96, that in principle there is no distinction between the 
enforcement of arbitration and choice of court agreements by injunction. 
120 Donohue v Armco Inc, supra n 65. 
121  See, eg, Amoco (UK) Exploration Co v Teesside Gas Transportation Ltd, 26 June 1996, 
Queen’s Bench (“Amoco v TGTL”).
122  The German court reacted with grave indignation to an English anti-suit injunction: 
Re Enforcement of an English Anti-Suit Injunction [1997] ILPr 320, a reaction that 
appeared to come as something of a surprise to the English courts: Phillip Alexander 
Securities and Futures Ltd v Bamberger [1997] ILPr 73 at [48]. On the other hand, the 
English court reacted with similar indignation to a New York anti-suit injunction: 
General Star International Indemnity Ltd v Stirling Cooke Brown Reinsurance Brokers 
Ltd [2003] ILPr 19; [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 719. The House of Lords acknowledged 
the indirect interference with the procedure of foreign courts in Turner v Grovit,
supra n 23, at [22]–[29]. 
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57 One important limitation appears to be that, as a matter of 
international comity, the court would only act to enforce the agreement if 
it is the contractually chosen forum. Otherwise, it would leave the parties 
to their remedies at the contractually chosen forum. In Akai Pty Ltd v The 
People’s Insurance Co Ltd,123 the High Court of Australia had, based on its 
own mandatory statutory rules, assumed jurisdiction to determine a 
dispute even though the contract in question had contained an exclusive 
choice of English court clause. The aggrieved party then sought an anti-
suit injunction from the Singapore court to prevent the other party from 
continuing with the Australian proceedings in breach of contract.124 The 
High Court refused to act, on the basis that “the Singapore court should 
not assume the role of an international busybody”.125 This position has yet 
to be considered at an appellate level in Singapore. It is arguable that, 
because the court is being asked to enforce a contract, assistance should 
be rendered to the contractual forum so long as the court of the forum is 
the natural forum for the enforcement of the choice of court agreement.
This may be the case where the respondent’s only substantial assets are in 
the forum (so that the respondent only has an incentive to obey an order 
from the forum and nowhere else), or where the applicant has substantial 
assets in the forum and legitimate reasons to pre-empt the potential 
enforcement of any foreign judgment, obtained in breach of agreement, 
in the forum. A foreign judgment obtained in breach of an anti-suit 
injunction granted by the court of the forum would not be recognised or 
enforced in the forum because the contempt of court involved in the 
process invokes a public policy defence in the forum.126
58 In conclusion, the basis of the anti-suit injunction in the 
contractual context is clearly the enforcement of the agreement. Although 
considerations of international comity are still important, it is also clear 
they are less weighty when the question before the court is the 
enforcement of an agreement. 
123  (1996) 188 CLR 418. 
124 People’s Insurance Co Ltd v Akai Pty Ltd [1998] 1 SLR 206. It was not argued in the 
case, and no separate proceedings were taken elsewhere, on the basis that the 
commencement of anti-suit proceedings in Singapore was itself a breach of contract 
and therefore the subject of stay of proceedings (in the forum) or anti-suit 
proceedings (in the contractual forum). 
125 Ibid at [12]. In a non-contractual context, the House of Lords had declined to act to 
issue an anti-suit injunction to protect a foreign natural forum on the same 
considerations: Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119. 
126 WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka, supra n 53. 
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VI. The effect of non-exclusive choice of court agreements 
59 The effect of an exclusive choice of court clause can be easily 
stated, even if there are difficulties in the application of the test: Prima 
facie, parties will be held bound to their agreement, either by the stay of 
local proceedings commenced or continued in breach of an exclusive 
foreign jurisdiction clause, or by the restraint of foreign proceedings 
commenced or continued in breach of an exclusive forum127 jurisdiction 
agreement, unless strong cause is (or strong reasons are)128 shown why the 
party seeking to breach the jurisdiction agreement should not be held to 
its agreement. There is also no difficulty whether the exclusivity of the 
choice of court agreement is mutual or unilateral; the party bound has to 
justify the breach of contract. 
60 It is more difficult, however, to state clearly the effect of a non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreement.129 On the face of it, there is no element 
of derogation in a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement, so there is in 
principle no issue of breach of agreement, and no reason for any 
justification for strong cause based on the bargain of the parties. On one 
view, the only relevant test in theory is that of forum conveniens or forum 
non conveniens, and the only effect of a non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement would be as a factor to be weighed in such an exercise. The 
only relevant issues arising would be the weight to be given to the fact 
that a forum has been indicated by the parties, and other policy 
considerations which may be attached to such a choice of the parties. 
However, an examination of the cases reveals that there are many ways in 
which a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement can be relevant, including 
several important reasons based on the contractual analysis of upholding 
bargains.
61 These reasons will first be examined in the contexts of 
applications for stay of proceedings and service out of jurisdiction, as 
these are where the bulk of the authorities occur. The implications of 
these lines of reasoning in other contexts will be considered after that. 
127  Query whether this applies to exclusive foreign jurisdiction agreements in favour of a 
third country. See para 57 of the main text above. 
128  The phrases “strong cause” and “strong reasons” are interchangeable: see Donohue v 
Armco, supra n 65, at [24]. 
129  See para 2 of the main text above. 
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A. Exercise of jurisdiction 
(1) Right to sue in the contractually chosen forum 
62 A non-exclusive choice of court agreement clearly confers a right 
on the contracting parties to have proceedings begun in the chosen 
forum. This is the effect of the submission by agreement. At least where 
the court of the forum is the non-exclusively chosen forum, there has 
been a tendency in the English court to see in this right to sue also a right 
not to have the suit heard elsewhere,130 ie, an implied derogation. Thus, 
the fact that the parties have submitted themselves to the chosen court, or 
have contractually bargained for their disputes to be heard in that chosen 
court, implies that there is a right to have the dispute resolved only in that 
forum. The consequence is that the burden is always on the party seeking 
to have the action tried elsewhere to justify why the party who wishes the 
action to be tried in the forum should not be able to exercise the right to 
sue in the forum and to have the dispute resolved in the forum. As 
Hobhouse J saw it in an application to stay forum proceedings where 
there was a non-exclusive forum jurisdiction agreement:131
If the contract says that [X] is entitled to sue [Y] in the English courts, 
then it requires a strong case for the courts of this country to say that 
that right shall not be recognised and that he must sue elsewhere. 
63 In Commercial Bank of the Near East Plc v A, B, C and D,132
Saville J said, in respect of a non-exclusive forum jurisdiction clause, in 
the context of an application for leave for service out of jurisdiction:  
[I]n the ordinary way and in the absence of strong reasons to the 
contrary, the Court will hold the parties to their bargain with regard to 
jurisdiction. … In the present case the jurisdiction clause in the 
guarantee did not … provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
English Courts because it gave the bank the right to enforce the 
guarantee in any other competent jurisdiction. To my mind, however, 
this makes very little difference to the principle that the Court will hold 
130 The Standard Steamship Owners’ Protection and Indemnity Association (Bermuda) Ltd 
v Gann [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 528; Gulf Bank KSC v Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd 
[1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 323; Cannon Screen Entertainment Ltd v Handmade Films 
(Distributors) Ltd 11 July 1989, Queen’s Bench; S & W Berisford plc v New Hampshire 
Insurance Co, supra n 45; British Aerospace Plc v Dee Howard & Co, supra n 4; 
Commercial Bank of the Near East Plc v A B C and D [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 319; Amoco 
v TGTL, supra n 121. 
131 S & W Berisford plc v New Hampshire Insurance Co, supra n 45, at 638. 
132 Supra n 130, at 321. 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2005) 338
the parties to their bargain in the absence of strong reasons to the 
contrary. 
64 In Standard Steamship Owners’ Protection & Indemnity 
Association (Bermuda) Ltd v Gann, Hirst J, in respect of an application for 
leave for service out of jurisdiction where there was an agreement by the 
parties to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the English court, 
said, citing exclusive jurisdiction clauses authorities:133
[T]he Court will give effect to that submission, although still retaining a 
discretion to grant a stay if the defendants can show strong reasons 
against holding the parties to their bargain…  
This contractual reasoning has been repeated in many cases,134 and the 
reason why it is not seen even more often is probably because it is taken 
as a point too obvious to require stating. Thus, the English Court of 
Appeal in Celltech R & D Ltd v Medimmune Inc stated:135
[T]here must be “strong reasons” for granting a stay where there is a 
contract giving jurisdiction to the court. That is for the obvious reason 
that jurisdiction is the parties’ bargain.  
This line of reasoning has also recently surfaced in Singapore.136
65 However, the rhetoric of the enforcement of a contractual 
bargain has not been matched by substantive explanation of the content 
of the agreement that is being enforced. In common law systems, there is 
a distinction between a right to commence proceedings (which depends 
on the existence of jurisdiction) and the right to have a dispute eventually 
resolved by the courts (which depends on the court exercising its 
jurisdiction).137  If parties agree to have their disputes resolved in a 
particular court (as opposed to merely submitting themselves to the 
133 Supra n 130, at 533, citing The Chaparral, supra n 106 and The El Amria, supra n 73 
(both of which are exclusive jurisdiction agreement cases). 
134  See, eg, Mercury Communications Ltd v Communication Telesystems International 
[1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 33 at 41; UBS AG v OMNI Holding AG [2000] 1 WLR 916 
at 925; JP Morgan Securities Asia Pte Ltd v Malaysian Newsprint Industries Sdn Bhd,
supra n 2, at 42–43; Import Export Metro Ltd v Compania Sud Americana de Vapores 
SA, supra n 2, at [16]; Breams Trustees Ltd v Upstream Downstream Services Inc, supra
n 2, at [21] and [27]. 
135  [2004] EWCA Civ 1331 at [23]. 
136 Asia-Pacific Ventures II Ltd and Others v PT Intimutiara Gasindo [2002] 3 SLR 326; 
Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale v Kong Kok Keong, supra n 2. Both are noted in 
Joel Lee “Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses – Changing Approaches?”, supra n 8. 
137  See Part II Section A of the main text above. 
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jurisdiction of the court), it may be a legitimate inference on appropriate 
facts that the parties had intended that no other court should adjudicate 
the case. In such an event, there is clearly an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause.138
66 However, if no such inference is drawn, and the conclusion is that 
it is a non-exclusive choice of court agreement, then it is difficult to see 
why it should necessarily follow from the agreement that the parties had 
also agreed not to bring any actions in other jurisdictions, or agreed not 
to do anything that will result in the chosen forum not hearing the case. It 
is the corollary of a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement that the parties 
have reserved the right to have the dispute resolved in another 
jurisdiction. It has not been articulated what is the correlative obligation
to the right to sue that is being enforced. So, refusal to accept service of a 
writ from the contractually chosen forum will usually be a breach of an 
agreement to submit to the jurisdiction. There will probably be a breach 
if one of the parties takes out an anti-suit injunction to restrain the other 
party from commencing action in the chosen forum; this is clearly in 
breach of the right to sue in the chosen court.139 But a party, in asking the 
chosen court not to exercise its jurisdiction, does not by that action alone 
breach an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the forum. 
67 The argument that an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of 
the court giving the opposing party the right to sue in the forum implies 
a correlative obligation to accept the exercise of that court’s jurisdiction 
for reasons of forum conveniens has been taken one step further: that 
actual submission is a good enough reason to imply that same correlative 
obligation. Thus, in JP Morgan Securities Asia Pte Ltd v Malaysian 
Newsprint Industries Sdn Bhd,140 it was suggested that since the rationale 
for the enforcement of a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement was that in 
such cases there was no need to protect the defendant against the 
unilateral exercise of a state’s legal authority in assuming jurisdiction over 
the defendant, no distinction needs to be drawn between actual 
submission after the commencement of proceedings and prospective 
submission by agreement. A version of this reasoning was echoed in the 
Singapore case of Societe Generale v Tai Kee Sing,141 where the court said 
that the defendant was not in a position to object to legal proceedings 
138 British Aerospace Plc v Dee Howard & Co, supra n 4, at 375. 
139 Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd v Islamic Republic of Pakistan [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
571.
140 Supra, n 2, at [42]. 
141 Supra, n 2, at [7]. 
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instituted in the Singapore court once he had acknowledged the 
jurisdiction of the court.  
68 With respect, it is difficult to see the contractual logic in this 
argument. The submission of a party to the jurisdiction of the court is a 
matter between that party and the court.142 In itself it is merely an 
acknowledgement of the court’s jurisdiction; it does not necessarily 
connote any waiver of objection to the exercise of such jurisdiction, and it 
has nothing to do with the agreement between the parties. In so far as the 
submission may be pursuant to a non-exclusive jurisdiction, it is the 
contract, not the submission, that creates any rights or liabilities between 
the parties. Something more is required to draw the contractual inference. 
69 It is submitted that, on a proper understanding of the contractual 
analysis, the critical question is whether there is a derogation agreement 
that can be inferred or implied from the right to sue in the chosen court, 
before one has recourse to the upholding of bargains as the basis for 
requiring strong cause. In other words, an independent contractual basis 
needs to be found. It is not good enough to say that because one party has 
a right to sue in the forum, the other therefore cannot start proceedings 
elsewhere. To the author’s knowledge, this argument has not been applied 
to a right to start an action in a foreign court conferred by a choice of 
foreign court agreement. It is doubtful if this “submission to jurisdiction” 
or “right to sue” argument adds any substantive value to the current 
jurisprudence. Little is offered by way of explanation except the need to 
uphold the parties’ contractual bargain. But what is the content of the 
bargain? This will be considered in the following three sections. In other 
words, while the right to commence proceedings in the chosen court has 
been conferred by the contract, whether or not there is a further right to 
have the dispute resolved only in that chosen court depends on whether 
the parties have agreed not to commence action elsewhere, or agreed to 
waive any objections to the non-exclusively chosen court exercising 
jurisdiction, or agreed not to argue that another forum should hear the 
case for reasons of forum non conveniens, or agreed not to do anything 
that will prevent the chosen court from trying the merits of the dispute. 
142  Conversely, a defendant who acknowledges the jurisdiction of the court of the non-
contractual forum by submission is not thereby precluded from arguing that the 
court should hold the claimant to an exclusive foreign jurisdiction agreement. There 
is no waiver of the breach of contract for the same reason; the fact of submission to 
the jurisdiction has nothing to do with the parties’ contract. 
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(2) Agreement to waive objection to jurisdiction 
70 An agreement to waive objection to jurisdiction bargain is 
increasingly becoming an express term of parties’ agreement, but it may 
also be implied from a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. One or both 
parties agree to waive any objections to a chosen forum exercising 
jurisdiction. This clause is often seen with the choice of jurisdictions by 
one contracting party (which may amount to a unilateral exclusive 
jurisdiction clause by implication), where the other party agrees not to 
object to the jurisdiction of any court chosen by the first party.  
71 Two versions of this waiver of objection agreement can be 
discerned. First, the agreement could be construed as one not to object to 
the chosen court exercising its jurisdiction on the principles of the 
natural forum. Second, it could be construed as an agreement not to 
object to any argument that the chosen forum should hear the case on the 
principles of the natural forum. The scope of the waiver (which is a 
further question of construction of the agreement) could theoretically 
include not only factors of convenience but also factors of justice (ie, at 
both stages of the natural forum test).143 The first construction of waiver 
of objection to the exercise of jurisdiction by the chosen court is more 
specific; the promise only relates to proceedings before the chosen court. 
This will be referred to as the narrow waiver of objection clause. The 
second construction, a promise not to object to any argument that the 
chosen court should hear the case, is effectively the same argument 
pitched at a more general level of abstraction, not being tied to any 
particular forum. The second construction will be referred to as the wide
waiver of objection clause.  
72 If there is a non-exclusive choice of court clause selecting the 
court of the forum (Singapore), and one party has agreed not to object to 
the chosen court’s exercise of its jurisdiction (the narrow waiver of 
objection clause), and proceedings are commenced in Singapore, that 
party, in asking the court to stay proceedings because, eg, Ruritania is the 
more appropriate forum, is acting in breach of contract, and is expected 
to show strong cause why the agreement should not be upheld. 144
However, if it is a non-exclusive choice of foreign court (Ruritania) clause 
coupled with the narrow waiver of objection clause, then if the 
143  See Part II Section A of the main text above. 
144 Bambang Sutrisno v Bali International Finance Ltd, supra n 81, noted in Aedit 
Abdullah, “Jurisdiction Clauses and Waiver of Forum Non Conveniens” [1999] SJLS 
674.
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proceedings are commenced in Singapore, the party who has agreed to 
the waiver but commences action in Singapore and seeks to persuade the 
court to exercise its jurisdiction is not acting in breach of contract. He has 
only promised not to object to the court in Ruritania exercising 
jurisdiction; his promise has nothing to do with what arguments he can 
raise in the Singapore forum. The party who wants to stay the action so 
that the court in Ruritania can hear the case cannot therefore put the 
party who commenced the action in Singapore to showing, to the level of 
strong cause, why the action should continue in Singapore. Thus, the 
narrow waiver of objection clause has the same effect as an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause, putting the burden on the party in breach of contract 
to the requirement of strong reasons, but only from the perspective of the 
(non-exclusively) chosen court. 
73 If the wide waiver of objection clause is used, however, then it 
operates as an exclusive jurisdiction clause in both situations. If the court 
of the forum is selected, then the party asking the court of the forum not 
to exercise its jurisdiction is acting in breach of contract because he has 
agreed not to argue that any other court should hear the case on the 
principles of the natural forum. If the court of Ruritania is chosen, then 
the party who wants the Singapore court to exercise its jurisdiction is 
acting in breach of contract because he has agreed not to argue that any 
court other than the court in Ruritania should hear the case on principles 
of the natural forum. In both cases, the party in breach has to 
demonstrate the reasons to the standard of a strong cause to justify why 
he should be allowed to breach the agreement. 
74 In both cases, the breach of agreement does not lie in the 
commencement of the proceedings, but in raising arguments based on 
the principles of the natural forum. But this has to be understood in the 
context of the two-pronged concept of jurisdiction in the common law: 
the existence and exercise of jurisdiction.145 While the traditional choice 
of court clause attacks the first prong (commencement of proceedings to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the court), this new waiver of objection clause 
attacks the second (whether the jurisdiction having been invoked should 
be exercised). The latter is a relatively new phenomenon. But this is 
because the exercise of jurisdiction as a significant aspect of the concept 
of jurisdiction in the common law is barely 20 years old.146 Technique 
should not obscure substance. Whether the agreement relates to the 
145  See Part II Section A of the main text above. 
146  See supra n 12. 
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commencement or the exercise of the jurisdiction, in both cases, so long 
as the element of derogation is clear, it should be seen as the selection of 
an exclusive147 forum to determine a dispute.148 In this context, the only 
relevant distinction lies in the scope of the agreement. In a simple 
traditional exclusive jurisdiction agreement, any argument to the effect 
that the chosen court should not hear the case is a breach of agreement. 
In a waiver of objection case, whether an argument is a breach of 
agreement depends on the scope of the waiver agreement: whether both 
parties are bound; and the scope of the arguments that the party so 
bound had agreed not to raise.  
75 It follows from this argument that there is no bright-line 
distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements. 
In every case it is a question of the scope of the parties’ bargain. This 
conclusion should not be startling; it is a logical corollary of the 
contractual basis of the enforcement of jurisdiction agreement. 
76 If a non-exclusive choice of court clause is accompanied by an 
express waiver of objection agreement, then it ought to be given effect to, 
even if it means practically giving effect to an exclusive or semi-exclusive 
choice of court agreement. However, in many cases, such waivers are 
implied. In England, the prevailing judicial view (though not yet tested by 
the House of Lords) is that the narrow waiver of objection clause is 
necessarily implied into every non-exclusive choice of court clause,149 at 
least where the choice of court agreement is governed by English law.150
This has the effect of turning all non-exclusive choice of court agreements 
147  It may be mutually or unilaterally exclusive. 
148  In a different context, English law has recognised the need to see common law 
jurisdiction as a composite of existence and exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, asking a 
court not to exercise its jurisdiction is no longer regarded as submission to the 
jurisdiction of the court to determine the merits of the case, even though such an 
application invariably involves acknowledgement of the existence of the jurisdiction 
to determine merits: UK Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (c 27), s 33. 
Singapore law has come close to making the same move judicially, though it has not 
actually done so: WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka,
supra n 53. 
149 British Aerospace Plc v Dee Howard & Co, supra n 4; Commercial Bank of the Near 
East plc v A B C and D, supra n 130; Amoco v TGTL, supra n 121; Mercury 
Communications Ltd v Communication Telesystems International, supra n 134; 
Burrows v Jamaica Private Power Co Ltd [2001] EWHC Comm 488; JP Morgan 
Securities Asia Private Ltd v Malaysian Newsprint Industries Sdn Bhd, supra n 2; Credit 
Suisse First Boston (Europe) Ltd v Seagate Trading Co Ltd [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 784, 
801. See also Fawcett, supra n 8, at 234–235. 
150  This must be so since the interpretation of the jurisdiction agreement is subject to its 
proper law. 
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(governed by English law by the choice of the parties or by default 
because no foreign law is proven) into exclusive jurisdiction clauses when 
proceedings are commenced in the chosen court, but not when 
commenced in another jurisdiction.151 It has the practical result that a 
non-exclusive choice of forum court agreement has a much more 
powerful effect than a non-exclusive choice of foreign court agreement in 
the court of the forum; thus encouraging parties to go to the chosen 
court to enforce the jurisdiction agreement. There is some evidence that 
Singapore courts are following the same line of reasoning,152 but the 
evidence is not conclusive.153
77 On the present state of authorities in Singapore, it is not clear 
when a waiver of objection agreement will be implied if it is not an 
express term. Further, it is also not clear, if such an inference is drawn, 
whether it will be the narrow or wide version. There is little guidance 
from the courts thus far. The English approach, which has been followed 
to some extent in Singapore, can be criticised. To say that a party, in 
agreeing to submit to a jurisdiction, has thereby agreed not to object to 
the exercise of the jurisdiction by the chosen court (the narrow waiver of 
objection agreement), as many English cases have done,154 seems to be 
drawing the line somewhat narrowly and artificially between the court of 
a foreign country and the court of the forum. In this context, there does 
not appear to be any good reason in principle (apart from the parties’ 
contractual intention) why non-exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses 
should be treated differently from non-exclusive forum jurisdiction 
clauses.155 Practically, the approach is beneficial to a country whose courts 
are frequently chosen even if it is on a non-exclusive basis, in channelling 
judicial business to that country, but it creates a potential problem of not 
treating like cases alike if the assumption is simply that parties always 
intend more when they choose (non-exclusively) the court of Singapore 
than if they choose the court of a foreign country. 
151 Amoco v TGTL, supra n 121. 
152 Baiduri Bank Bhd v Dong Sui Hung, supra n 33; Societe Generale v Tai Kee Sing, supra
n 2.
153  See the cases in n 156 below, where no such inference had been drawn. 
154  See especially British Aerospace Plc v Dee Howard & Co, supra n 4 and Amoco v  
TGTL, supra n 121.
155 The Chapparal, supra n 106, at 164; Burrows v Jamaica Private Power Co Ltd, supra
n 149. Cf The Rothnie, supra n 13, at 211, where the wide version was apparently 
adopted, but this line of reasoning appears to have been marginalised since: see 
Banque Francaise de l’Orient v Chesterbrook Financial Corp, 25 October 2001. 
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(3) Agreement as to appropriate forum 
78 The court is likely to infer from the non-exclusive choice of court 
clause at least that the parties had thought (but not in any contractual 
sense) that the chosen forum was an appropriate one to resolve their 
disputes. On this view, the clause is merely a factor to be weighed when 
the court determines where the natural forum for the dispute lies.156 On 
the other hand, the court may go further. 
79 A non-exclusive choice of court clause may be said to represent 
an agreement between the parties that the chosen court is an appropriate 
forum, or is the most appropriate forum,157 to adjudicate the disputes 
arising within the jurisdiction clause. If the agreement has any 
promissory content at all, then it must mean that there is an undertaking 
not to argue otherwise. The former inference does not have much 
significance for courts like those in Singapore which determine the 
question of natural forum not by reference to whether it is an 
inappropriate forum,158 but whether it is not the clearly more appropriate 
forum. In the case of the latter inference, it should follow that it would be 
a breach of contract to argue that any other forum is the more 
appropriate one to hear the parties’ dispute. This means that the 
promissory content would be practically the same as the wide waiver of 
objection clause discussed in the previous section. Whether the subject 
matter of the agreement also extends beyond appropriateness to factors 
of justice is a question of construction. 
80 Theoretically, whether any such agreement is to be implied from 
the non-exclusive choice of court clause, and whether such inferred 
agreement has any promissory content, and if so, what content, are all 
issues governed by the proper law of the jurisdiction agreement. It would 
be helpful if the intentions of the parties are clearly spelt out, but 
156 Industrial & Commercial Bank Ltd v Banco Ambrosiano Veneto SPA [2000] 
SGHC 188; Datuk Hamzah bin Mohd Noor v Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan 
Iskandar Al-Haj [2001] 4 SLR 396; Yugiantoro v Budiono Widodo, supra n 5; Malayan
Banking Bhd v Measurex Engineering Pte Ltd [2001] SGHC 5. See also The Rothnie,
supra n 13, at 211. 
157  Not surprisingly, this inference is not usually drawn in cases where several 
jurisdictions are specified as possible venues for litigation: Baiduri Bank Bhd v Dong 
Sui Hung, supra n 33. 
158  Compare the Australian approach based on the clearly inappropriate forum (Voth v 
Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538), where an agreement that a forum 
is appropriate will have greater impact on the test for the exercise of jurisdiction. The 
Australian approach has been rejected in Singapore: Eng Liat Kiang v Eng Bak Hern
[1995] 3 SLR 97. 
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unfortunately, in many cases it is up to the courts to draw their own 
inferences. Unfortunately, the cases reveal more conclusions than 
explanations, and sometimes even the conclusions are not very clear. 
81 In PT Jaya Putra Kundur Indah v Guthrie Overseas Investments Pte 
Ltd,159 the Singapore High Court inferred from a non-exclusive choice of 
foreign (Indonesian) court clause that the parties had agreed that it was 
an appropriate forum, and it was held that the claimants should not be 
heard to argue that Indonesia was not an appropriate forum. But the 
party seeking to have the case heard in Singapore was not put to argue on 
the basis of strong cause why the action should continue. If the 
agreement, though promissory, only related to an appropriate forum, it 
would not be a breach of contract for the claimants to argue that 
Singapore was the more appropriate forum. Thus, it was not surprising 
that the court considered that the jurisdiction clause was only one of the 
factors going to the question of appropriateness in determining the 
natural forum for the dispute; it had no further effect. Thus far, no case in 
Singapore has gone so far as to infer from the non-exclusive selection of a 
court that the parties have agreed that it is the most appropriate forum so 
that it would be a breach of contract to argue that any other court than 
the chosen court should adjudicate any substantive issues falling within 
the dispute resolution clause. Arguably, however, some English cases have 
taken that step,160 although the authorities often do not make it clear 
which of the possible contractual inferences discussed in this article is 
being drawn. 
82 If the inference is indeed drawn that the parties have agreed not 
to argue anything inconsistent with the proposition that the non-
exclusively chosen court is the most appropriate forum, then the 
contractual analysis should follow logically, and a party should be allowed 
to argue, in breach of agreement, that a non-chosen forum is more 
appropriate, only by showing exceptional circumstances amounting to 
strong cause. 
159 Supra n 13. Approved of in Bambang Sutrisno v Bali International Finance Ltd, supra
n 81. 
160 S & W Berisford plc v New Hampshire Insurance Co, supra n 45, at 638; Cannon Screen 
Entertainment Ltd v Handmade Films (Distributors) Ltd, supra n 130; British 
Aerospace Plc v Dee Howard & Co, supra n 4; Amoco v TGTL, supra n 121; Marubeni 
Hong Kong and South China Ltd v The Mongolian Government acting through the 
Ministry of Finance of Mongolia [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 873 at [64]. There are few 
reported cases where such inferences have been drawn in respect of foreign 
jurisdiction agreements. Cf The Rothnie, supra n 13, at 210–211; Ace Insurance SA-
NV v Zurich Insurance Co [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 618 at [62]. 
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83 In the absence of explicit terms, there is little guidance on when
any such contractual inferences are to be drawn. This is a question of 
construction of contract, and so it is probably difficult to go beyond the 
principle that it depends on the circumstances of individual cases. It is in 
this context that one has to understand the statement in British Aerospace 
Plc v Dee Howard Co,161 that such inferences will be easily drawn in “freely 
negotiated” jurisdiction agreements. It is not possible to draw a bright-
line between freely negotiated jurisdiction agreements and jurisdiction 
agreements found in contracts of adhesion. It is suggested that no such 
distinction was intended.162 In deciding what the parties intended the 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement to mean, the court is entitled to 
consider the circumstances of the bargaining, including facts like whether 
the jurisdiction agreement is a standard term, the circumstances of its 
incorporation and the extent of the negotiations that went into the final 
wording of the clause. There is an unfortunate trend in both Singapore 
and English courts to extol the virtues of contractual enforcement, but 
with little explanation of the exact content of the agreement being 
enforced. This has the tendency to obfuscate the contractual rationale for 
requiring strong cause; and may obscure the need for careful scrutiny in 
every case of the content of the parties’ agreement. 
(4) Agreement that the chosen forum is the primary forum for dispute 
resolution
84 The contracting parties may have identified one forum as the 
“primary” forum for dispute resolution because of its neutrality, even if 
both parties may have reserved the right to sue in other jurisdictions. This 
may be achieved with the unilateral exclusive jurisdiction agreement with 
the right of one party to choose another jurisdiction for trial, in which 
case, it is just a one-sided exclusive jurisdiction agreement. Alternatively, 
neither party may choose to be (or one party may have enough 
bargaining power to resist being) so bound, yet they may choose to 
identify a primary forum among several non-exclusive jurisdictions. This 
may have important contractual consequences. 
85 In Royal Bank of Canada v Coöperative Centrale Raiffeisen-
Boerenleenbank BA,163 it was argued, in an application for an anti-suit 
injunction to restrain the party who had commenced proceedings in a 
161 Supra n 4, at 376. 
162 Import Export Metro Ltd v Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA, supra n 2, at 
[14(iii)]. Cf Fawcett, supra n 8, at 249–250. 
163  [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 471. 
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foreign country, that it was an implied term in a contract containing a 
non-exclusive forum jurisdiction agreement that the parties had agreed 
that an English trial would take precedence over a foreign one (the 
applicant commenced English proceedings one day after the 
commencement of foreign proceedings). The argument was rejected on 
the basis that the court would not imply a term to contradict an express 
one, since both parties had expressly reserved the right to commence 
proceedings elsewhere. Parallel proceedings were therefore clearly within 
the contemplation of the parties, and there was no breach of contract in 
the commencement of foreign proceedings, even if there was a conflict of 
jurisdiction with the English court. This argument may, however, be 
taken more seriously by the court in the future in the absence of such an 
express term. 
86 In the jurisdiction context, the argument would have to be 
slightly modified, that the parties have agreed that they would not argue 
that the case should be heard in any other forum once a case is 
commenced in the primary forum. If such an agreement is inferred or 
implied, it would be a breach of contract to argue in the primary forum 
that the case should be heard elsewhere, and strong cause would need to 
be shown to justify the breach. It would also be a breach of contract to 
argue before a non-chosen forum that it should exercise its jurisdiction to 
hear the case if proceedings are ongoing in the primary forum, with 
similar consequences for the breach of contract, unless the parties only 
agreed not to object to the court of the primary forum exercising its 
jurisdiction.164
(5) Factor in natural forum test 
87 It is not in doubt that, whatever may be inferred or implied about 
the parties’ intentions as to the scope of the agreement embodied in the 
jurisdiction agreement, the fact that a court has been chosen by the 
parties, albeit non-exclusively, is relevant in the application of the 
principles of the natural forum. The fact that the parties thought that the 
chosen forum was at least an appropriate forum to determine their 
disputes must surely carry some weight in the court’s determination.165
What weight this factor will carry must depend on all the circumstances 
of the case. In a number of Singapore cases, no particular weight was 
164  Similar to the narrow waiver of objection agreement discussed in Part VI 
Section A(2) of the main text above. 
165 Bambang Sutrisno v Bali International Finance Ltd, supra n 81, at [11]. 
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given to the existence of a non-exclusive forum166 or foreign167 jurisdiction 
agreement, but this could be because the point had not been seriously 
pressed by counsel. 
88 It goes too far, perhaps, to say that a non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement will never be accorded any more weight than any other 
connections in the case under consideration.168 On the other hand, it may 
also go too far to say that a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement will 
always be a strong indicator of the appropriate forum to hear the case.169
The weight to be attributed to it ought to depend on the circumstances. It 
may make a difference whether the jurisdiction clause formed part of a 
closely negotiated contract or is a standard term in a contract of adhesion. 
Where the parties have clearly put their minds to the consideration of the 
clause, that will understandably be a very strong factor.170 On the other 
hand, if the parties have indicated a list of possible countries for the 
disputes to be tried, then the choices may not mean very much in terms 
of comparative appropriateness, and the court may even be justified in 
not giving any particular weight to the clause.171
89 One very important consideration is that the parties may have 
chosen a non-exclusive but primary forum for dispute resolution because 
of its neutrality. Quite apart from the possible contractual implications,172
this may be an important factor in itself. In Attock Cement Co Ltd v 
Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade,173 Staughton LJ said:  
We should ... look with favour on a choice of our own jurisdiction, 
when it appears to have been made in order to find a court which is 
neutral rather than one that is convenient.  
166  See supra n 156. 
167 Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v Hartadi Angkosubroto, supra n 5; Itochu Steel 
Asia Pte Ltd v CV Wira Mustika Indah [1999] SGHC 321; Yuk Wah Ho David v Gao 
Jia Ren [1998] SGHC 101.  
168  As the Hong Kong courts appear to have done: Yu Lap Man v Good First Investment 
Ltd [1998] HKLRD (Yrbk) 104; T & K Electronics Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd
[1998] 1 HKLRD 172. See also Morrison v Panic Link Ltd 1993 SLT 602, affirmed in 
1994 SLT 232; Fawcett, supra n 8, at 251–252. 
169 Fawcett, supra n 8, at 259. 
170 S & W Berisford plc v New Hampshire Insurance Co, supra n 45, at 463. 
171  See, eg, Baiduri Bank Bhd v Dong Sui Hung, supra n 33. See also BAS Capital Funding 
Corp v Medfinco, supra n 49, at [192]. 
172  See Part VI Section A(4) of the main text above. 
173  [1989] 1 WLR 1147 at 1161; BAS Capital Funding Corp v Medfinco Ltd, supra n 49, at 
[190]. The only relevant reference was an obiter one to the case of the enforcement of 
an exclusive jurisdiction agreement (at [191]). 
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This was considered to be a very important factor for the forum to hear 
the matter in the case of a non-exclusive forum jurisdiction agreement, 
quite apart from any contractual analysis, in BAS Capital Funding Corp v 
Medfinco Ltd.174
90 Thus, the existence of a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
may be of significance in many cases in the court’s determination of the 
exercise of its jurisdiction, and may consequently impose the tactical
burden of showing strong factors in favour of trial elsewhere on the party 
arguing against the agreed forum, and may even require something close 
to the “strong cause” standard used in the contractual analysis to 
neutralise the existence of the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. This, 
however, should not be confused with the contractual analysis; there is no 
party in breach of agreement, and no cause for shifting the legal or 
evidential burden. However, there may also be justification beyond the 
rationale of the prevention of breach of contract for disregarding 
foreseeable factors of inconvenience, or at least the attachment of little 
weight to such factors. As noted by Rix LJ:175
If a party agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of a state, it 
does not easily lie in its mouth to complain that it is inconvenient to 
conduct its litigation there (that is to assert that the agreed forum is a 
forum non conveniens).
91 The reason does not lie in the upholding of any “bargain” or the 
prevention of breach of contract. It lies simply in the commonsensical 
assessment of the persuasive force of the argument by such a person, 
especially if the evidence indicates that the parties had made a conscious 
choice of a neutral forum. 
B. Summary 
92 The common law rationale for the enforcement of exclusive 
choice of court agreements is to uphold the bargain of the parties within 
a procedural context. Thus, while the court retains discretion to allow a 
breach of contract, it requires the party seeking not to be bound by the 
contract to show strong cause within the contra-indicating factors to 
justify the breach of agreement. In recent years, the rationale of 
upholding bargains – with its logical corollary of placing the burden of 
174 Supra n 49, at [186]–[193]. See also Egon Oldendorff v Libera Corp [1995] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 64 at 72. 
175 Ace Insurance SA-NV v Zurich Insurance Co, supra n 160, at [62]. 
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proof on the party arguing against the chosen forum and the imposition 
of the burden of strong cause on such a party – has been applied with 
equal force in the case of non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements, 
especially clauses in favour of the court of the forum. It has been argued 
that this approach is justified if, but only if, there is indeed an agreement 
and a breach or threatened breach of that agreement. This involves an 
exercise in the construction of the jurisdiction agreement, and possibly 
the implication of terms, in accordance with the law applicable to the 
jurisdiction agreement (which is usually the same as the law governing 
the contract in which the jurisdiction agreement is found, and in default 
of proof of which the contract law of the forum would apply). 
93 The parties may have agreed to accept the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the chosen court once one of the parties invokes its right 
to sue in that court. The parties may have agreed to waive any objection 
to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court chosen in the agreement (the 
narrow waiver of objection agreement). The parties may have agreed to 
waive any objection to any argument that the chosen forum should hear 
the case on principles of the natural forum (the wide waiver of objection 
agreement). The parties may have agreed that the chosen forum is clearly 
the most appropriate forum and not to argue against that proposition. 
The parties may have agreed that the chosen forum is the primary forum 
for dispute resolution, and that they would argue that any other forum is 
more appropriate once the jurisdiction of that forum has been invoked. 
But it is also possible that the parties may not have agreed to anything 
except to give the chosen court a basis for assuming jurisdiction (the 
strict sense of prorogation in respect of the existence of the jurisdiction). 
The contractual analysis requires the court to determine the content of 
the bargain of the parties in respect of the non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement. 
94 Apart from any possible contractual bargain, the non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement could be of significance as a factor to be weighed 
in the application of the principles of the natural forum. The weight of 
this factor must depend on the circumstances of the case. Although the 
effect of this in a case of a closely negotiated contract selecting a neutral 
forum for dispute resolution can be very great and might even resemble 
that of the enforcement of a contractual bargain, the rationale is totally 
different. The two lines of reasoning should be kept distinct. 
95 One important consequence of the analysis presented in this 
article is that there is no theoretical distinction between an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement and a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. The 
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distinction is a practical one of the content and scope of the agreement of 
the parties. An exclusive jurisdiction agreement clearly implies an 
agreement not to argue that any other forum should hear the case on the 
basis of, at least, factors foreseeable at the time of the contracting. A non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreement can bring with it a variety of promises in 
respect of different factors. The same governing principle is that the court 
will only allow a party to breach the contract upon proof of strong cause 
on the facts why he should be allowed to do so.  
96 The second important consequence of this analysis is that it is 
erroneous to treat all non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements as if they 
have the same effect. In every case, the promissory content, if any, needs 
to be teased out. This may be seen to lead to uncertainty. However, it is 
suggested that this will be an improvement over the current situation 
where inferences are drawn, often by implication, about the parties’ 
intentions in many cases without articulating the reasons for these 
inferences. A possible step to reduce uncertainty may be to use 
presumptions,176  although  that  itself  may  present  difficulties  if  the 
presumptions are applied too rigidly.177 Neither is it a practical problem 
that the construction is a matter for the proper law of the jurisdiction 
agreement. If foreign law is not proved, the court will simply apply its 
own domestic contractual principles of construction and implied terms 
by default. The Singapore courts have acquired tremendous experience in 
the construction of contracts, especially commercial contracts. It should 
not be difficult for the courts to develop principles relating to the 
construction of non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements beyond the present 
state of uncertainty, once it is clear that this is what the courts are doing. 
Contracting parties can create greater certainty by being very clear about 
the obligations assumed in respect of the non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement.178
176  This is a partial solution only, as it is likely to be a substantive issue of construction 
governed by the proper law of the contract. A presumption of exclusivity to be 
applied as the law of the forum (see, eg, Brussels I Regulation, supra n 116, Art 23, 
and the draft Hague Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Art 3(b), 
supra n 1) is easier to justify if there is a broad measure of agreement of approach 
globally, or if it operates within a group of countries with similar rules. 
177 Cf the rejection of the use of presumptions in the common law determination of the 
objective proper law of a contract noted in Coast Lines Ltd v Hudig & Veder 
Chartering NV [1972] 2 QB 34 at 44 and 47. 
178  See, eg, Royal Bank of Canada v Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA,
supra n 163, where the express reservation of rights to commence proceedings 
elsewhere was decisive. 
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97 A third consequence is that the “modified Spiliada approach”179 is 
simply the application of the contractual analysis within the natural 
forum context, in respect of factors which the parties have agreed not to 
raise in arguments, just as the approach in Amerco Timbers180 is the 
contractual analysis within the same natural forum context in respect of 
the totality of factors that fall within an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. 
There is still a strong element of judicial policy in the operation of the 
“strong cause” when giving effect to the promissory content of the non-
exclusive choice of court agreement.  
98 Further, quite apart from the contractual analysis, the weight to 
be accorded to the jurisdiction agreement must also depend on the facts. 
This, however, is simply a routine aspect of the judicial determination of 
the natural forum: the court must attach different weight to different 
factors depending on the individual circumstances of the case.  
C. Other implications of the contractual analysis of non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements 
99 The significance of the contractual basis for the enforcement of 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements goes beyond the context of the 
exercise of jurisdiction. Because such agreements differ from exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements only in terms of what has been agreed, practically 
all issues in which exclusive jurisdiction agreements have been relevant 
will be germane to the enforcement of non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements. Four main issues are briefly discussed below. 
(1) The equality of forum and foreign jurisdiction agreements 
100 A contractual analysis would suggest that it should not matter 
whether the clause in question is a forum or foreign one. It has frequently 
been stated that forum and foreign jurisdiction clauses should be treated 
alike.181  Indeed,  any  other  attitude  would  be  evidence  of  judicial 
chauvinism. Agreements should be construed in the same way whether 
they point towards a court of the forum or a foreign country. Thus, for 
example, any inference of an agreement as to the primacy of the court of 
the forum as a dispute resolution forum may be drawn whether the 
179 Supra n 4; Fawcett, supra n 8, at 249–250. 
180 Supra n 73. 
181  See, eg, The Chaparral, supra n 106, at 164; Import Export Metro Ltd v Compania Sud 
Americana de Vapores SA, supra n 2, at [15(ii)]; Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co 
Ltd , supra n 65, at 104. 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2005) 354
neutral court chosen is one that sits in the forum or a foreign state.182
International comity also suggests that the narrow waiver of objection 
agreement183 should not be inferred in the absence of clear indications of 
the parties’ intention to this effect, for the result of this clause is that a 
foreign jurisdiction agreement contains no promissory content before a 
court in the forum, while a forum jurisdiction agreement can have the 
same effect as an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. 
(2) Anti-suit injunctions 
101 It has been seen above, in the context of the exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement, that the court will readily grant an anti-suit injunction184 to 
prevent a breach of contract. In principle the position should be the same 
in respect of the breach or threatened breach of a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement. Thus, the English court may grant an anti-suit 
injunction to restrain foreign proceedings taken to prevent the applicant 
from suing in England pursuant to a non-exclusive forum jurisdiction 
agreement.185  The  foreign  action  is  intended  to  prevent  the 
commencement of proceedings in the forum, which the applicant has a 
clear contractual right to do. In this context, any agreement or otherwise 
about the exercise of the jurisdiction of the English court is simply 
irrelevant. This is a special case because the foreign proceedings involve 
anti-suit proceedings. 
102 In the ordinary case, the commencement or continuation of 
foreign proceedings will not amount to a breach of a non-exclusive forum 
jurisdiction in itself, as the parties have not expressly bound themselves to 
bring their disputes to the forum. However, the court may infer an 
intention not to bring or continue parallel proceedings in foreign 
countries when there is an action in the “primary” forum in the non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreement, in the absence of exceptional  
182 Cf the quote at para 89 of the main text above. 
183  See Part VI Section A(2) of the main text above. 
184  More accurately, an anti-anti-suit injunction. 
185 Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, supra n 139. See Adrian 
Briggs, “Decisions of British Courts during 2003: Private International Law” (2003) 
74 BYBIL 511 at 528.  
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circumstances.186 In a stronger form of this argument, the commencement 
of foreign proceedings may be viewed as a breach of an agreement not to 
object to the agreed (non-exclusive) jurisdiction of the court of the 
forum.187 The agreement in this sense must be read more broadly to 
preclude more than just the objecting to the exercise of the jurisdiction of 
the court of the forum or even the raising of arguments that the chosen 
forum is not the or an appropriate forum; it must mean objecting in the 
broad sense of doing anything anywhere that will prejudice the position 
of the chosen forum as the only forum that will adjudicate the dispute.188
103 In principle, the anti-suit injunction is intended to protect a 
contractual right, and it is only called an “anti-suit” injunction because in 
the context the injunction is intended to prevent a legal suit from being 
commenced or continued in breach of contract. A party’s contractual 
right not to have certain arguments raised against it in foreign 
proceedings could in principle also be the subject of protection by an 
injunction from the court of the forum as well. Suppose that there is a 
non-exclusive Singapore jurisdiction agreement, and the court infers 
from it an agreement that neither party would raise any argument that 
the Singapore court should not hear the case on principles of the natural 
forum. Suppose that one of the parties commences an action in Ruritania 
and intends to argue in that court that it is the most appropriate forum to 
hear the case in spite of the jurisdiction agreement. This is an impending 
breach of contract, and following the reasoning in the anti-suit cases, 
could be the subject of an injunction from the Singapore forum unless 
strong cause can be shown why the party is right to want to make those 
arguments in breach of contract. The same issues could arise in the case 
of a non-exclusive foreign jurisdiction agreement in favour of the court 
of Ruritania, and one of the parties commences proceedings in Utopia 
186 Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, supra n 139, at [36] and 
[52]. It is difficult to understand this case in any other way than as a case of 
construction or implication of term of non-derogation in this sense. The formal 
analysis that the foreign conduct was prima facie vexatious and oppressive because it 
was contrary to the “spirit” of the non-exclusive forum jurisdiction agreement (at 
[36]–[37]) seems rather disingenuous and irrelevant in the light of the court’s view 
of the parties’ (implied) contractual intention. See also Royal Bank of Canada v 
Coöperatieve Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA, discussed at para 85 of the main text 
above.
187  In Bankers Trust International plc v RCS Editori SpA [1996] CLC 899 at 907, 
Longmore J, after finding “a promise that the defendant will not object to English 
jurisdiction”, held that, in bringing foreign proceedings, “that is precisely what they 
are doing”, and that was a good reason to grant an injunction. In the European 
context, this case must of course now be read subject to the developments discussed 
in supra n 116.
188  See also Part VI Section A(4) of the main text above. 
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intending to persuade the court in Utopia that it is the most appropriate 
forum to hear the case, with the complication discussed above whether 
the Singapore court would act where it is not the forum chosen to 
adjudicate the substantive dispute.189
104 Apart from any breach of contract, the existence of a non-
exclusive forum jurisdiction agreement could be taken as a strong reason 
supporting the claim for an anti-suit injunction.190 There is no doubt that 
the existence of such an agreement must be considered together with all 
other factors in weighing the facts to determine whether the conduct in 
bringing proceedings in the foreign court is vexatious or oppressive. The 
non-exclusive forum jurisdiction agreement affects the degree of 
appropriateness of the forum as the venue for the resolution of the 
dispute, and this has a bearing on the question whether the conduct 
abroad is vexatious or oppressive. But as in the case of the exercise of its 
own jurisdiction by the court of the forum, the weight to be accorded to 
such an agreement must vary with the circumstances of the case. 
(3) Defence to foreign judgment 
105 Under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,191 it 
is a defence192 to the registration of a judgment from a gazetted country193
if “the bringing of the proceedings” in the foreign court is contrary to a 
dispute resolution agreement.194 If the commencement of the foreign 
proceedings can be said to be a breach of the non-exclusive (forum or 
foreign) jurisdiction agreement in the ways discussed in previously,195
then the foreign judgment will not be registered. 
189  See para 57 of the main text above. 
190 UBS AG v OMNI Holding AG, supra n 134, at 925. This is one interpretation of 
Bankers Trust International plc v RCS Editori SpA, supra n 187 at 907, and Sabah 
Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, supra n 139, discussed at supra
n 186. 
191  Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed. This defence does not exist under the Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Commonwealth Judgments Act (Cap 264, 1985 Rev Ed), and there is no evidence 
of its existence in the common law. 
192  For an interesting discussion of the effect of prorogation of jurisdiction of the foreign 
court on the analysis of potential defences to the recognition or enforcement of 
foreign judgments, which is beyond the scope of this article, see Adrian Briggs, 
“Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Rethinking the Law on Foreign 
Judgments” (2004) 8 Singapore Year Book of International Law 1. 
193  So far, only Hong Kong SAR has been gazetted under this legislation. 
194 Supra n 191, s 5(3)(b), provided the judgment debtor has not submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the foreign court. The proviso appears to be a conflation of 
submission to jurisdiction with waiver of breach of agreement: see para 67 of the 
main above. 
195  See Part VI Sections A(1) to A(4) of the main text above. 
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106 While the statutory defence clearly strikes at the commencement
of proceedings in breach of agreement, it is less clear whether it applies in 
cases where all that can be said is that the parties had agreed not to argue 
against the appropriateness of the chosen forum, even though there has 
been a breach of agreement to channel the dispute to another 
jurisdiction. It may be that the statutory defence can also apply if the 
breach of agreement was a crucial part of the chain of events constituting 
the “bringing” of the proceedings in the foreign court. Moreover, in such 
cases, there is another potential defence. If an injunction had been sought 
beforehand from the forum to prevent such arguments from being raised 
in the foreign proceedings, and if it can be said that the foreign judgment 
was obtained as a result of the breach of the injunction, then it should 
follow that the party in contempt should not be able to enforce the fruits 
of its contempt in the court of the forum.196
(4) Damages for breach 
107 To the extent that damages may be available for losses caused by 
the breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement,197 in principle, such 
damages, sounding in contract, should also be available for breaches of 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements. It is comparatively straightforward 
if the express or implied agreement is one not to commence or continue 
foreign proceedings; in such cases, there would clearly be no foreign 
proceedings or judgment but for the breach of contract. Difficulties in 
showing causation may arise where the breach of contract is the making 
of prohibited arguments in foreign courts in order to persuade them to 
take jurisdiction. But this is a practical difficulty and should not affect the 
potential availability in principle of damages for losses properly 
recoverable within the limits imposed by the proper law of the 
jurisdiction agreement for the breach of contract. 
VII. Conclusion 
108 The enforcement of exclusive choice of court agreements, where 
there is a clear obligation not to bring proceedings other than in the 
contractually specified court, is a highly significant aspect of international 
civil litigation. The common law learning in this respect is fairly clear. 
The starting point is the enforcement of a contractual agreement, even if 
the ending point is the balancing required by the procedural jurisdiction 
196  See para 57 of the main text above. 
197  See para 33 of the main text above. 
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context. There are still many questions that remain outstanding,198 and 
the standards for allowing the parties to breach the agreement may not be 
the same in common law jurisdictions, but the basic contractual theme is 
clear. At a broader level, the respect for party autonomy in the selection of 
dispute resolution fora is fast gaining ground, beyond the realm of 
international arbitration, to that of cross-border litigation. The current 
project on choice of court agreements at the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law199 is compelling testimony of the importance of 
such techniques in the channelling of cross-border disputes today, even if 
this may not translate to contractual enforcement of such agreements. 
109 The contractual theme is very important in the analysis of the 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement. It provides the rationale for a test 
different from merely weighing the different factors in the natural forum 
doctrine. It explains why the burden is always on the party seeking to 
depart from the agreement to justify that departure, and why that 
justification must be based on exceptional circumstances amounting to 
strong cause, even if the same factors are being considered as in the 
natural forum doctrine. It explains why an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement can sometimes be binding only unilaterally. It explains the 
parity of approach towards the enforcement of jurisdiction agreements in 
both the exercise of jurisdiction as well as the anti-suit injunction context. 
It provides the explanation for the nascent remedy of damages for losses 
caused by breaches of jurisdiction agreements. It has shown how 
arbitration agreements are enforced, and can show the way forward in 
respect of how other types of dispute resolution agreements can be 
enforced. Most importantly, in the context of this article, it shows how 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements can and should be approached. 
110 Non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements are equally important as, 
if not more important than, exclusive jurisdiction agreements in cross-
border civil litigation, not only because they are very frequently used 
today to engender greater flexibility in the choice of litigation forum, but 
also because they have not been subject to as close scrutiny as exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements. This article has argued that the contractual 
analysis of the exclusive jurisdiction agreement is equally applicable to 
the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. The only distinction between 
the two types of agreements lies in the content and scope of the bargain. 
198  Many of these are choice of law questions, relating to issues like the capacity of the 
parties to enter into the agreement, the formation of the jurisdiction agreement, and 
the severability of the jurisdiction agreement. 
199 Supra n 1. 
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In the context of the modern understanding of international civil 
jurisdiction in terms of the concepts of the existence and exercise of 
jurisdiction, agreements relating to the two aspects of a court’s 
jurisdiction should not be treated differently.  
111 The consequence of this contractual analysis is that the 
distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive agreement is not a 
theoretical one as such. It is still a useful practical distinction to make, as 
the exclusive jurisdiction agreement connotes certain clear obligations 
undertaken by the parties. But sometimes the obligations undertaken in a 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement, whether in respect of the 
commencement of proceedings or the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction, 
can be equivalent to those found in exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
(unilateral or bilateral).200
112 In the case of the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement, it has 
been argued that it is important to determine the content of the 
contractual bargain between the parties. There is no simple contractual 
analysis of the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement apart from the 
agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the chosen court; in every case 
it is a question of what the parties have agreed to beyond the simple 
submission, either as a matter of construction or as a matter of 
implication of terms, according to the proper law of the jurisdiction 
agreement where it is proved. And in so far as there is a bargain to be 
enforced, the same analysis as in the case of exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements should apply in respect of that bargain, but not beyond it. 
Beyond the contractual analysis, the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
carries some weight in the determination of the natural forum. It is not 
possible to pre-assign weights to non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements. 
The weight to be attached to it must depend on the circumstances of 
individual cases. 
113 The practical consequence of the analysis in this article is that 
more attention should be paid to the drafting of jurisdiction agreements, 
especially in the case of non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements. The effect 
of the agreement on the question whether a particular forum will 
200  This may cause some complications in the context of the draft Hague Convention on 
Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, supra n 1: Would any of the combination of 
obligations discussed in this article expressed, inferred from or implied into the non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreements render it “exclusive” for the purpose of the 
Convention? 
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eventually exercise its jurisdiction to hear the substantive merits of the 
dispute is ultimately outside the control of the contracting parties 
because that is a question of that forum’s procedural law in the conflict of 
laws sense. However, the strong emphasis given in this context to the 
enforcement of contractual rights in common law countries should 
provide enough incentive for contracting parties to spell out their 
respective rights and obligations in respect of the choice of litigation 
forum more explicitly, especially once the intention goes beyond the 
simple case of a mutually binding exclusive choice of court agreement. 
